GAMBLE ON THE JORDAN JOE ALEX MORRIS, Jr.

THE NATION

JANUARY 2, 1967 *35 cents*

Upsala College
Library
East Orange, N. J.

THE LOGIC & LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGY

HARVEY WHEELER

Means, Ends & Human Institutions

•

LORD BOWDEN

How Much Science Can We Afford?

'LA VIDA' AND US

Oscar Lewis / **ELMER BENDINER**

'Overtaken by Events' / **WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS**

'My Fourteen Months with Castro' / **KAL WAGENHEIM**

NEWSPAPER NEW
UPSALA COLLEGE LIBRARY
EAST ORANGE
NEW JERSEY 07019

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS

material evidence

New York City

DEAR SIRS: Your editorial, "Those Missing Exhibits" [Nov. 14], misses a point which seems also to have eluded all the other writers commenting on the situation.

Since when does the family of a murder victim have the right to decide what is and what isn't evidence, and when, if ever, it may be examined, and by whom?

According to the Bureau of Census estimates, 8,500 people were murdered in the U.S. in 1963, one of whom was John F. Kennedy. Presumably the other families were equally bereaved and substantially worse off. Did any of these decide what evidence the authorities would be permitted to examine? Wouldn't this constitute withholding evidence in a felony? *Robert S. Calese*

myth and rhetoric

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIRS: Jack Newfield's article ["The Bobby Phenomenon," *The Nation,* Nov. 14] is myth making in the greatest sense of the word. As a member of "the young, the black, the alienated, the romantic, the educated," I do not feel these groups will be so easily deceived into thinking they need this . . . leader who only identifies with them in that rhetoric he supposedly deplores so much as Newfield asserts. The biggest myth of all is that any real change desired and needed by these people will be achieved by replacing the "liberal" Democratic President Johnson with another "liberal" Democrat called Robert Kennedy. *O. Marshall Seavey*

Russian poets

Clinton, N.J.

DEAR SIRS: The lesson about poets that the world has never seemed to learn is that, though they may write lovely poetry, they are inclined all too often to be essentially irresponsible, through a failure of intelligence and a one-sided sensibility. Thus they become—the concomitant of irresponsible—dangerous. Nations which put them in jail are often only looking to survival, a time-honored, well-recognized prerogative of nations. . . .

The degree of irresponsibility, born of ignorance, or shall we say stupidity, rather than malice, of such figures as Pasternak, Siniavsky and Daniel was profound. It boils down to who is to be served—"the greatest good of the greatest number" or the willful, capricious and unreliable private sensibility? *Bruce Watson*

New York City

DEAR SIRS: Simon Karlinsky's book review ["Yevtushenko and the Underground Poets," *The Nation,* Nov. 21] . . . proved, in an erudite way, that Yevtushenko is rather a mediocre poet [but] . . . Professor Karlinsky avoided any political implications in his analysis. . . . Yevtushenko is often described as a "rebel" and a courageous one, but it seems his courage and revolt were always in harmonious accord with the Politburo's aims, claims and needs: in other words—only when courage and rebellion were allowed to certain carefully chosen writers and intellectuals. . . . The warm ballyhoo given to Yevtushenko by the American press, presenting him as the charming "bad boy" of Russian literature, the embarrassing appreciation from men like Robert Kennedy, Arthur Miller and John Steinbeck, seems to me a serious moral defeat for intellectual America. It constitutes an insult to all those who really work to enlarge the margin of human dignity and intellectual independence in the Soviet Union . . . and who cannot dream of getting an exit visa to visit even Poland or Czechoslovakia. . . . *Leopold Tyrmand*

EDITORIALS

Peace and the Pentagon

The Hanoi bombings of December 13 and 14 represent an egregious piece of mismanagement and clumsy public relations. What could have been more stupid than to bomb within or close to the city as the Christmas cease-fire approached, while the Pope's plea for peace was still reverberating in people's minds and Senator Mansfield had added his voice to the same end, and when U Thant, surely not without preconditions, had consented to remain as Secretary General of the UN? The unhappy Robert McCloskey at State was left holding the bag until, two days later, the Pentagon released a map showing the "city limits" of Hanoi, to support a contention that the bombs had fallen no closer than 2⅛ miles from this boundary. Suppose enemy bombers scored hits on Teaneck or Yonkers, would there not be a basis for a protest that New York City had been under attack? Among neutrals, and men of good will everywhere, more credence will be given to the North Vietnamese protests than to the Pentagon's excuses.

But was it mere clumsiness that Hanoi was punished precisely at this juncture? Whenever peace talk has been in the air, some such incident has occurred. A pattern so uniform at least raises the suspicion that *someone* must be misreading instructions or construing them in such a way as to obstruct moves for peace. President Johnson is said to be selecting the North Vietnamese bombing targets personally. But, as Richard Fryklund points out in the Washington *Star,* the President "does not . . . approve each day's bombing, *leaving that decision to the military.*" Further: "The decision this week to attack the Hanoi area *was made by the military* when the weather cleared, according to Pentagon sources." (Italics added.) Whoever gave the orders for these operations at this particular time was surely not so stupid as to overlook their political significance. One is almost forced to conclude that these tried and true methods of upsetting possible progress toward negotiations have been applied by design.

If so, we must expect more of the same, in one guise or another. Nevertheless, hopes that the United States will cease escalating the war and make serious overtures for peace have been raised by Ambassador Goldberg's letter of December 19, asking U Thant to take "whatever steps you consider necessary to bring about the necessary discussions which could lead to a cease-fire." Hopes have been dashed so often that no seasoned observer will regard this overture with glowing optimism, but it may mark the beginning of the long and difficult process of ending the war. For one thing, it is not accompanied by the circus atmosphere of a "peace offensive," with ambassadors of good will dispatched to all parts of the world to prove that the North Vietnamese, the Vietcong and the Chinese Communists are reckless aggressors if they do not accept our generous offer. This time the tone is quiet and the language has a chastened sound, quite unlike the earlier phrasing, which could be summed up as a demand that the enemy come to the conference table or have his head bashed in.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But there is a more cogent reason for regarding the current moves as something more than a smoke screen for further enlargement of the war. A headline in the New York *World Journal Tribune* reads: "Johnson Up to Neck in Troubles," and this observation is echoed in newspapers all over the country. And, as all agree, the chief of Mr. Johnson's troubles, and the cause of most of the others, is the war in Vietnam. Rarely if ever in American history has a President been plunged so quickly from the pinnacle of success and popularity to public disapprobation. He has little time to extricate himself before the electioneering of the 1968 campaign begins in earnest. Since Mr. Johnson has always understood foreign policy primarily in its effect on domestic politics, he must be looking for a way out of the disastrous impasse into which he has led the country—and himself.

Possibly, also, the article by McGeorge Bundy in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs* reflects a growing anxiety within the Johnson Administration about the U.S. course in Southeast Asia. Reading Mr. Bundy's present views, one finds it hard to believe that only a few months ago he was one of the principal advocates of a hard line toward the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists. Now he tells us that a victory for Ho Chi Minh "would not mean automatic communization of all Asia, and the defeat of aggression would not mean an end to the pervasive—if sometimes exaggerated—threat of China." Bundy's thesis is that this and other foreign policy questions should not be viewed as black and white but in shades of gray. To try to defeat Hanoi would be wrong, this new Bundy argues, on three counts: it would carry great risk of war with China and the Soviet Union; it would engage us in a "new and terrible contest for which we have no taste or need"—a contest for the future of North Vietnam; and it would not settle the issue in the South.

But it is precisely these three risks which Mr. Johnson is now confronting. The new Bundy, not the old, is the one to whom Mr. Johnson should lend his ear, and perhaps that is the view to which he is now turning.

Science and State

The desuetude of the Department of State cannot be blamed solely on Secretary Rusk, although he cannot be absolved either. Under his leadership State has fallen as far behind the times as the Post Office. This is not a mere matter of inconvenience, but a condition that adds to the dangers of an already precarious world situation. (See article by Smith Simpson, for many years a State Department foreign officer, to be published in *The Nation* January 9.) A generally neglected factor in State's disability is discussed by Prof. Eugene B. Skolnikoff of M.I.T. in the November 25 issue of *Science*. State acts almost as if the science-technology revolution had never occurred. It has a science office, but the post of Director of International Scientific and Technological Affairs has been vacant for more than two years and efforts to fill it have so far been unsuccessful. Recent history tells why. An earlier version of the office, established in 1950, was allowed to atrophy by Secretary Dulles. In 1958, after

IN THIS ISSUE

January 2, 1967

EDITORIALS

2

ARTICLES

6 Gamble on the Jordan — *Joe Alex Morris, Jr.*

Logic & Limits of Technology:

9 Means, Ends and Human Institutions — *Harvey Wheeler*

17 How Much Science Can We Afford? — *Lord Bowden*

BOOKS & THE ARTS

22 Outside the Kingdom of the Middle Class — *Elmer Bendiner*

23 Last Chance for Democracy — *William A. Williams*

24 The Ultimate Antientropy (poem) — *Theodore Weiss*

25 Bridge to Disenchantment — *Kal Wagenheim*

26 Recent Books on Latin America — *Marysa Navarro Gerassi*

26 An Anthology of Nothings — *H. R. Wolf*

27 To Solve a Paradox — *Victor Rabinowitz*

28 War (poem) — *Ned O'Gorman*

29 Fluoroscoping the AMA — *Richard Carter*

29 Theatre — *Harold Clurman*

31 Crossword Puzzle — *Frank W. Lewis*

JAMES J. STORROW JR. Publisher

Editor CAREY McWILLIAMS
Managing Editor ROBERT HATCH
Literary Editor HELEN YGLESIAS
Poetry Editor MICHAEL GOLDMAN
Copy Editor MARION HESS
Advertising Manager MARY SIMON
Washington ROBERT G. SHERRILL
Paris ALEXANDER WERTH
Theatre HAROLD CLURMAN
Art MAX KOZLOFF
Music BENJAMIN BORETZ
Science CARL DREHER

The Nation is published weekly (except biweekly in July and August) by the Nation Magazine Company and copyright 1967 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10014. Tel.: CH 2-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing office.

Subscription Price: One year, $10; two years, $18. Foreign and Canadian postage: $1 extra per year.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Information to Libraries: **The Nation** is indexed in Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION *Vol. 204 No. 1*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Sputnik crisis, efforts were made to revive it, but the performance since then has not been such as to attract a first-rate man when the post became vacant.

As Skolnikoff puts it, "The Secretary of State's role as chief policy adviser to the President will . . . be increasingly in jeopardy if the Department . . . continues to be deficient in effective technical-political competence, while the issues with which it must deal involve ever more sophisticated scientific and technological elements."

The fact that State can get, for the asking, scientific or technical advice from agencies which are well informed in their particular fields is precisely why it needs an office of its own to evaluate such counsel. Skolnikoff cites several instances: one will suffice to show the nature of the difficulty, although not necessarily as Skolnikoff sees it. In 1962, Khrushchev included in his congratulatory telegram on the Glenn orbital flight an offer for cooperation in space. President Kennedy asked the appropriate agencies to develop proposals for a reply. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration came forward with decided views. Its performance in the recent Gemini series has, of course, been brilliant, but the fact remains that, then and now, the idea foremost in the minds of the NASA managers has been to beat the Russians to the moon. It was hardly necessary for them to knock down foolish schemes like mating a Soviet lunar capsule with an American rocket, or putting a Russian and an American pilot into a space vehicle. But they also dismissed practical possibilities for cooperation (not necessarily limited to the United States and the USSR) which would have assisted the astronauts and taxpayers of both countries, while continuing to give full scope to the initiative and ingenuity of the engineers. Instead, for "technical" reasons, NASA killed all ideas that might have resulted in cooperation on a significant scale. Handicapped as it was, the State Department could neither advance proposals of its own nor raise questions that might have exposed NASA's built-in parochialism.

The actual danger inherent in the present situation is illustrated by the confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis, which Skolnikoff does not mention. (He does refer to the siting of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the mid-fifties, and the later Skybolt contretemps.) In Cuba we were in the stronger position and Khrushchev had to yield, but the Defense Department may overestimate the power of a weapons system, or the American advantage in a strategic situation. If an adversary knows such an evaluation to be excessive but the State Department does not, matters may proceed to a lethal showdown.

Aside from such hazards, under the present setup opportunities for positive action are being neglected. Developments in such fields as health, transport and agriculture should weigh in the formulation of foreign policy. While technology is pulling the nations together into one world, the United States, foremost in the field, is technologically backward in its foreign secretariat.

The deficiency will not be easy to remedy. It is not only a matter of getting the right man for the job in the sense of scientific and engineering competence; he must be something of a statesman as well. Men possessed of such composite talents exist but, assuming that one of them can be induced to apply for the job, unless the Secretary and his senior officers are persuaded of the importance of science and technology in the department's operations, the efforts of any individual will come to nought. Yet, as things stand, the fact that a serious deficiency exists is scarcely recognized in the high echelons.

The History Makers

The decision of the Kennedy family to support Jacqueline Kennedy in her suit to block publication of William Manchester's *Death of a President* has stimulated an outpouring of accusations, explanations, intimations and protestations unparalleled in the history of American publishing. At a time when the United States is mired abroad in its most hated and dishonorable war, and is faced at home with crises in the whole spectrum of its social problems, the attention of the country (and indeed of the world) is riveted on this fight between the late President's widow and the man designated to narrate the "official" account of Mr. Kennedy's last hours on earth.

The uproar may be fascinating but it is not informative. However, one thing plain to any observer is that a number of allegedly knowledgeable people involved themselves in an exceedingly unwise venture. Mr. Manchester should have known better than to sign a paper which gave the Kennedys—of all proud and opinionated people—the right to pass on his manuscript, line by line; the family and their associates should not have supposed that if they talked to Mr. Manchester with what seems to have been almost compulsive candor he would have the wit or will to suppress any confidences that might prove embarrassing; and *Look* magazine was, to say the least, incautious to pay an absurdly large sum for a manuscript whose clearance for publication rested on the optimistic interpretation of an ambiguous telegram. A number of people are being hurt by the consequences of supposing that history can be written to order.

The cascading notoriety of the affair is a function of the universal preoccupation with the details of the assassination. This is perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of a thoroughly deplorable episode. It now appears that Mrs. Kennedy and Mr. Manchester have been able to find ways of accommodating their differences. But the impression will inevitably be left with the citizens that—once again—a curtain has been dropped between them and a crucial event in their country's history.

If Americans in public life and the public eye will learn from this battle of wills to keep their hands off history, the attention currently being paid to Mrs. Kennedy's suit may not in the end seem so grotesquely out of scale.

Liebman on the Burning Deck

In an editorial, "That Committee Again" (November 28), we summarized our efforts to make clear to the public and Congress the simple fact that the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China is essentially the Committee of One—a promotion of Marvin Liebman, an enterprising press agent who specializes in right-wing causes. It is the nature of the profession that every publicist needs a full-blown sense of his own im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portance and powers of persuasion; Mr. Liebman's gifts in this line are legendary. The committee was organized in 1953, with the mission of obtaining a million endorsements to a fiery declaration of opposition to Communist China's admission to the United Nations and U.S. recognition of the Peking regime. The goal was achieved, largely through Mr. Liebman's energy, militancy and gall. Membership on the committee was automatic by virtue of the endorsement. Hundreds of nationally known names were recruited, including many members of Congress.

Each autumn, just before the General Assembly took up the question of China's admission to the UN, the committee bought space in a few leading newspapers to reiterate its stand. The last such manifesto appeared in the October 31 *New York Times*. Once again the committee triumphed (China was turned down more decisively than in the previous year); at the same time there were more misgivings as to its stand. These doubts culminated on December 17 with the formal resignation of Sen. Jacob K. Javits from the committee, on the ground that its position is so inflexible that it "forecloses even the hope of negotiation" with Peking. Mr. Javits told Mr. Liebman that while the great majority of nations participating in the latest UN vote believe that many issues remain to be settled before Peking "can claim respectable status in the eyes of the world," this did not mean that they wished to "cease efforts to bring Communist China into the community of nations."

By itself, Mr. Javits' withdrawal would scarcely have warranted the page 1 story which appeared in *The New York Times*, but he took the unusual step of sending copies of his letter of resignation to forty-nine other Senators and 284 Representatives who were still nominally members. The *Times* story suggested that members of Congress "had begun to have doubts about continuing to endorse the committee's policies." Evidently Mr. Javits wished to assuage their fears that constituents would find them guilty of the most intolerable offense a member of Congress can commit—allowing anyone to suspect that he might be "soft on communism." Perhaps forewarned of Mr. Javits' defection and the alienation of other Congressmen, Mr. Liebman announced on the same day that names of Congressional members would no longer appear on committee letterheads and publications. With these names missing, and with further withdrawals in prospect, the Committee of One Million may perhaps shrink to Marvin Liebman and a part-time secretary, which is just about what its importance warrants.

A Most Uncommon Man

This and future generations will forever be in debt to Irving W. Halpern, who died on December 10 at the age of 77. He was a most uncommon man. His public life, which spanned over fifty years, was a rare example of farsightedness and indefatigability in the service of enlightened principles of penology. An early advocate of probation in preference to imprisonment, a cause he was espousing as early as 1910, he brought to his work a formidable array of talent.

He was born in Russia and came to this country as a small child, where he was obliged to end his schooling early to go to work. Thus he later became probably the only high school dropout on the faculty of a major university, teaching criminology to graduate students at New York University School of Law. He was an accomplished writer, author of many works on crime and probation which are among today's standard reference works. Among his friends, Irving Halpern was a brilliant wit and an engaging storyteller who, had he so chosen, could have led a successful life in the theatre. He brightened his immediate world as he enlightened his profession.

His widow is Judge Caroline Simon of the New York Court of Claims, and New York's former Secretary of State. But the name of Mrs. Irving Halpern is as honorable a title as any she has won or worn.

The Hoffa Decision

From time to time the Supreme Court fails to bring its full resources to bear on an important issue, usually with the result that the issue is not properly settled and returns to haunt the Court in the future. The Hoffa decision belongs in this category. Two Justices, White and Fortas, did not participate in the decision. Justices Clark and Douglas would not have granted the writ of *certiorari* in the first place. The lower and intermediate appellate courts had found that the government had not planted an informer on Hoffa; Justices Clark and Douglas would have let the matter rest on this finding and for that reason took no part in the proceedings. The result was a 4-to-1 decision in which only the Chief Justice, to his credit, saw and met the issue squarely. Before discussing this issue, it should be kept in mind that the Court consented to review only one aspect of the case, namely, whether evidence obtained by means of deceptively planting a secret informer in the quarters and councils of the defendant during the trial violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Court did *not* review the question of what effect the barrage of anti-Hoffa publicity, much of which had been stimulated by the Attorney General, had had upon his right to a fair trial. And the Court did *not* pass on the question of the effect the government's intensive electronic surveillance of the defendant and his counsel had on "the right to counsel" (see "The Hoffa Trial" by Fred J. Cook, *The Nation*, April 27, 1964).

The question, then, came down to this: Edward Grady Partin, a local official of the Teamsters, against whom serious charges (embezzlement, kidnaping and manslaughter) were pending in the state and federal courts, was admittedly a government informer when he visited Hoffa and volunteered to aid him during the trial. Partin was paid by the government for the incriminating evidence he supplied and for the almost daily reports he furnished the prosecution of what was going on in the defense headquarters. Nevertheless, four members of the Court decided that since Partin had actually testified on direct examination only to matters which Hoffa had said outside the presence of his attorneys, the right to counsel had not been infringed. As Justice Stewart put it, "Partin did not enter the suite by force or by stealth. He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper." In brief, the Fourth Amendment offers no protection

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against misplaced confidence. While this reasoning is clear enough, it places such a narrow interpretation on "the right to counsel" as to make a mockery of that right.

The Chief Justice, who as district attorney of Alameda County had occasion to rely on the testimony of some extremely unsavory informers, lashed out at Partin's role in the Hoffa prosecution. Partin's motive, the Chief Justice said, for being an informer was "his strong desire to work his way out of jail and out of his various legal entanglements with the state and federal governments." Partin, he noted, had "been uniquely successful in satisfying that motive. . . . In the four years since he first volunteered to be an informer against Hoffa, he has not been prosecuted on any of the serious charges for which he was at that time jailed, and the state charges seem to have vanished into thin air." The Chief Justice said of Partin:

> This type of informer, and the uses to which he was put in this case, evidence a serious potential for undermining the integrity of the truth-finding process in the federal courts. Given the incentives and background of Partin, no conviction should be allowed to stand when based heavily on his testimony. And that is exactly the quicksand upon which these convictions rest, because without Partin, who was the principal government witness, there would probably have been no convictions here. Thus, although petitioners make their main arguments on constitutional grounds and raise serious Fourth and Sixth Amendment questions, it should not even be necessary for the Court to reach those questions. For the affront to the quality and fairness of federal law enforcement which this case presents is sufficient to require an exercise of our supervisory powers.

In another case which also involved a Teamster official (Dave Beck), Justice Douglas had occasion to say in the course of a dissenting opinion: "This case shows the need to make as sure as it is humanly possible that one after whom the mob and public passions are in full pursuit is treated fairly." The majority opinion on the Hoffa case may be technically sound, but the Chief Justice's indignant dissent will convince most thoughtful persons that Hoffa was not fairly treated. The precedent which the majority opinion establishes—if it is permitted to stand—will surely return to haunt the Court in the future.

GAMBLE ON THE JORDAN

JOE ALEX MORRIS, Jr.
Mr. Morris is Middle East correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. *He has been reporting from the Arab world over the past fifteen years.*

Beirut

The danger of war is ever present in the Middle East. It is not so much a danger of intent: everyone knows where his enemies' ambitions lie. Rather, the critical point centers on miscalculations in strategy.

Thus when Syria's President Nureddin Atassi publicly offered arms recently to any Jordanians who wanted to revolt against King Hussein, the resulting tension did not even close the borders. Conversely, rarely has reaction to an isolated event gotten so out of hand as in the case of Israel's punitive raid on three Jordanian villages in the Mount Hebron area last November 13. At dawn on that Sunday, Israeli forces struck at the border village of Samu some 10 miles south of Hebron, and at two other hamlets. It was a retaliation raid, Israel said, for terrorist activities emanating from these places.

The Israelis appeared anxious to avoid casualties, and by Jordanian account only six civilians were killed in the action. But anyone who walked through Samu, as I did the day after the raid, could see from the rubble-strewn street that more houses were destroyed than the forty acknowledged at first by Israel. The UN later put the number at 125. The international chorus of disapproval, capped by the Security Council's formal vote of censure against Israel, made many people both inside the Jewish state and outside wonder whether it had been worth while—particularly since Israel itself had proclaimed that the base for Arab terrorism was Syria, not King Hussein's pro-Western principality.

There are at least three possible explanations for Israel's action. The first is simply that the "hawks" in Israel's inner councils became exasperated by the mounting wave of terrorist attacks and decided to strike at the easiest target. Actions against Syria have been tried before, but the mountainous terrain along the Syrian frontier makes them difficult. That is the simplest explanation, but it raises the question of whether Israel's leaders would risk the international consequences for so little gain, especially when similar raids into Jordan in 1965 obviously had little effect. In addition, the action led to grave disturbances on Jordan's West Bank, and has put King Hussein into an embarrassing confrontation not only with the Arab states but with the Palestinian two-thirds of Jordan's population. If the young King should go, his replacement is hardly likely to be pro-Israel. The border has been fairly quiet since Samu, but few people think it will stay that way.

A second explanation—endorsed by no less an expert than President Nasser's unofficial press spokesman—is that Israel wants to create trouble for Jordan in the hope of taking over the rest of old Palestine when the Hashemite empire goes up in flames. Many Arabs, and quite a number of other people, are convinced that Israel must follow a policy of territorial expansionism as publicly urged by the Harut party, among others. The easiest and most obvious chunk of land is the West Bank, whose incorporation into Jordan by Hussein's grandfather is not recognized by most other Arabs.

The third notion is that Israel thought the time ripe to jab the Arabs again, both to keep them off balance and before they get too uppity. The mounting number of terrorist incidents inside Israel would certainly have played a part in such thinking. Probably the most important of these episodes was the sabotage last fall of three apartment buildings in a Jerusalem suburb. Nobody was hurt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and damage was slight, but psychologically it brought the enemy to the doorstep of every Israeli citizen.

Samu certainly produced quick political results. The attack set the Arabs battling tooth and nail—not against Israel but among themselves. Rarely have the recriminations and backbiting reached the present level, not to mention the outright appeals pouring from Cairo and Damascus radio stations for Palestinians to revolt against King Hussein.

Furthermore, it has brought into question—and into open debate for the first time—the whole concept of the United Arab Command. The UAC was a creature of the Arab summits, and its mission was to build for the day of reckoning with Israel. It had oil money from the affluent, and cannon fodder from the crowded streets and refugee camps in Jordan and the Gaza strip. The UAC also had a military plan, and the essence of it was that the Arabs should at all costs avoid a premature major engagement with Israel. The target date was 1970, or thereabouts. Meanwhile, Kuwait and Saudi money was to be used to help the poorer Arab states build up respectable military machines, and buy supersonic airplanes and modern ground equipment.

The Samu attack turned these plans into a shambles. The Jordanians have publicly complained about the lack of Egyptian air cover over Mount Hebron—a responsibility assigned to the Egyptians under the master plan. Cairo has countered by charging that Jordan refused to permit Egyptian planes to operate from the West Bank, and also blocked plans to move Iraqi and Saudi troops into Jordanian front-line positions. Jordan has come back to taunt Egypt with hiding behind the buffer of United Nations troops in the Sinai, and the Syrians—whipped up, as usual, to the maddest frenzy—have, as noted, offered arms to anti-Hussein elements in Jordan and pledged their army to assist when the insurrection starts.

From an Israeli point of view, the crowning success of the Samu strategy came when Syria launched Arab terrorists on sabotage missions—not into Israel, but into Jordan.



Yet when all the chips are counted, will the Israelis still be congratulating themselves for their cleverness? The Israelis were surprised at Samu when the hopelessly outnumbered Jordan frontier forces stood and fought. They were even more surprised when Jordan army reinforcements rushed into an ambush, then stood and fought—again under extremely adverse conditions after their vehicles had been shot out from underneath them (according to Western intelligence reports from Tel Aviv).

The Samu raid had one positive result from the Arab point of view. King Hussein is now committed to arming the frontier villages, something he had promised vaguely to do in the past but never carried out. From now on, the Arab world will watch closely to see that he keeps his word.

If one believes in an eventual Arab-Israeli military confrontation, as most Arabs do, Samu produced other benefits for the Arab side. The United States has agreed to speed up deliveries of some thirty-six early-model F-104 fighters to Jordan, and Washington has indicated it will give a sympathetic hearing to other Jordanian requests for "defensive" weaponry, such as armored personnel carriers. Both announcements were, of course, made largely to take the political pressure off Hussein, and in fact there is little point in delivering the Starfighters in advance of their programed date because the Jordanian pilots won't be ready to fly them. Still, the announcements reflected America's deep concern about the fate of the Hashemite King. And there is good reason to worry, for never before has the 31-year-old Hussein been under so much pressure from all sides.

Since Samu, Cairo, Damascus and the Cairo-based Palestine Liberation Organization have mounted a drumfire against the pro-Western monarch, accusing him of being a pawn of the Western powers and soft on Israel. The accusation stings, because Hussein has little control over his own foreign policy, so long as he is dependent on American and British subsidies to keep his barren country going.

Domestically, the Samu attack resulted in the most serious disorders on the West Bank since that area was incorporated into Jordan. There were general strikes in the main towns of Jerusalem, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron (only Bethlehem, with its penchant for the tourist dollar, stayed relatively clear of involvement). And almost everywhere, the strikes and accompanying protest demonstrations led to violence. After seventy-two hours of mounting troubles, Hussein had to call in crack Bedouin units of the army. The most feared of these are the desert patrol, which still dresses in the flowing ankle-length skirts worn by the Arab of the desert.

These troops are popularly known as "Glubb's Girls," after Gen. John Bagot Glubb, the last British commander of the old Arab Legion, and their appearance sends a shiver of fear down every Palestinian's back. When they discard their flowing red and white checked headdresses for tin helmets, the shop shutters ring down with alacrity all over the West Bank. The Jordan army quickly reestablished control, at the cost of eight civilian and security forces dead. But this is only the first step if there is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever to be a real reconciliation of the East and West Banks of the Jordan River under King Hussein's aegis.

The bitterness between the Palestinians, who form two-thirds of Jordan's population, and the old Jordanians who still run the government and almost everything else, is deep and real. It will not be overcome by platitudes such as King Hussein's constant repetition that "All Palestinians are Jordanians; all Jordanians are Palestinians."

The hostility was very much in evidence in the walled Old City of Jerusalem on the day when two anti-government demonstrators were killed by gunfire. Crowds roamed the narrow, cobblestoned streets, screaming filthy abuse of the King; on the wall of the government hospital, one of the wounded scrawled dramatically in his own blood the slogan: "We died for Palestine. Long live Egypt and Palestine."

What made the West Bank disturbances really serious was the fact that almost the entire Palestinian political leadership came out in support of the protests. The strike committees formed in the big towns included religious leaders, mayors and parliamentarians. Hussein's immediate reaction was to stop the political protest as his Bedouins had stopped the demonstrations. He banned a scheduled meeting in Jerusalem which was intended to draw up a list of grievances. The King probably had little choice. It was well known in advance that the assembly of notables would ask for drastic changes in Jordan's policy, and this could have been interpreted only as a sharp defeat for the government and for Hussein himself.

These repressive measures solved nothing, of course. The lid is back on the West Bank, but the pot continues to simmer. The question many Israelis are publicly asking is: was Samu worth it? From the point of view of Israel's own security, it hardly seems so. Heretofore, the West Bank had gone along with a sort of uncomfortable coexistence with the East Bank, with occasional isolated political eruptions. The zooming revenues from the tourist trade in the Holy Land were every year making this coexistence more palatable. In Jordan as a whole, the GNP was mounting at a healthy 8 or 9 per cent every year, and the first symptoms of an economic boom were beginning to be felt after years of making ends meet.

This boom is largely artificial, due in part to heavy injections of U.S. and other foreign aid. But both Jordanians and pro-Nasser Palestinians were beginning to make comparisons with the Socialist paradise down in Egypt and coming up with the answer that Jordan was not doing so badly after all. The renewal of the East Bank-West Bank confrontation has scotched any hope that this modest swing toward accepting the political realities of the Middle East today would continue. Is that what Israel really wanted?

Many political observers here have severe doubts about the effectiveness of any reprisal policy under present conditions. The Syrians, who are largely responsible for the terrorism that prompted it, were jubilant over the Samu raid; it gave them a golden opportunity to point out what happens to pro-Western Arab states. The bickering within the United Arab Command only confirmed what everybody already knew: that the UAC is ridden with dissension on key policy matters such as stationing and movements of troops. Nor would future reprisal raids against Syria be likely to change things very much. The Syrians have a knack for turning military embarrassments into political triumphs, much as Nasser did with the Suez campaign of 1956.

In fact, Samu probably helped the Syrians more than anyone else. It took the spotlight off the unstable and leftist regime in Damascus. Political tension drained out of the Syrian capital: for the first time in months, the Soviet T-34 tanks usually parked around the military headquarters in downtown Damascus were removed.

The Israeli attack on Samu thus appears to have helped Israel's worst enemies the most, and harmed grievously those of its Arab enemies least likely to rock the boat. This brings up the question: if not retaliation, what? There is no easy answer, but the solution might lie in what has happened in the divided village of Beit Safafa. Two years ago, the Israelis replaced the rusty barbed wire fence on the border there with a strong chain-link affair. There haven't been any incidents in Beit Safafa since. It could be argued that building a fence all around Israel would be expensive. It could also be argued that it would, in the long run, be cheaper than anything else in both political and human terms. Or perhaps the Israelis don't want to fence themselves in and the Arabs out. So, at any rate, believe many Arabs who view Israeli strategy in terms of long-range expansionism.

Where in the midst of this slowly cooking pile stands Gamal Abdel Nasser, who for all his domestic and other problems remains the key man in any Middle Eastern situation? The evidence is that—as he has so often in the past—the Egyptian *rais* finds himself straddling two divergent paths.

The most obvious is his support for "progressive" and "liberationist" movements everywhere in the Arab world, and his opposition to the conservatives, led by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Yet Nasser is quite obviously not prepared for a confrontation with Israel, and perhaps not even with King Hussein.

The Egyptians have rejected Hussein's taunts about hiding behind a UN protective umbrella in the Sinai with the highly dubious riposte that the UN emergency force is not there to seal off the border between Arab and Jew. With a limited and steadily declining number of men, the UN umbrella is largely symbolic; but then it always has been, and it has been effective because neither Israel nor Egypt will risk the international umbrage involved in challenging it.

There are signs that the Egyptians do not share the Syrians' determination to rub out Hussein and the Hashemite monarchy either. True, the Cairo radio is full of its usual venom and invective, as are the Egyptian papers. But when Palestine Liberation Organization leader Ahmed Shukairy said he would eventually lead Palestinian troops back into Jordan's West Bank, regardless of whether Hussein wanted them or not, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad commented succinctly that Shukairy spoke for himself, not the Egyptian Government.

The best prognosis, then, is that the Egyptians want to keep the political boat rocking, but are not ready to see it overturned. At least not if the end result were to be another round of big-power intervention in the Middle East.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LOGIC & LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGY

In recent years, and particularly since the publication in 1964 of Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society *(see Robert Theobald's review,* The Nation, *October 19, 1964), there has been a growing belief that scientific and technical acceleration, while not necessarily beneficial, must be accepted because technology is driven by a self-propelling logic that operates quite independently of human choice and direction. "Within the technical circle," to quote Ellul, "nothing else can subsist because technique's proper motion . . . tends irresistibly toward a completeness. To the degree that this completeness is not yet attained, technique is advancing, eliminating every lesser force."*

While Ellul's powerfully integrated argument has had the desirable effect of arousing public interest on the need to control and direct the technological process, it has also inadvertently contributed to the myth of the inevitability of this process. Since the subject is one of prime importance, The Nation, *in accordance with a practice of recent years of devoting the year-end issue to a general subject of major intellectual concern, has devoted the bulk of this issue to two essays which approach the problem of the growth of science and the spread of technology along converging lines. Harvey Wheeler, a staff member of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, and the author of its publications,* The Rise and Fall of Liberal Democracy *and* The Restoration of Politics, *submits Mr. Ellul's thesis to a rigorous, logical analysis, seeking to discover whether or not man is fated to be enveloped in a rigid technological mold over which he has little control. On the other hand, Lord Bowden, Principal of the Institute of Science and Technology at the University of Manchester, and until recently Minister of State for Education and Science, after demonstrating that exponential trends tend to abate—an assurance that will be gratefully received—approaches the subject from the viewpoint of priorities among the conflicting demands that modern communities make upon their common scientific resources. While these two papers deal decisively with the problems their authors set themselves, they have the virtue of all good social inquiry that implicit in their arguments is a wealth of suggestions for further investigation.*

—The Editors

Means, Ends and Human Institutions

HARVEY WHEELER

Jacques Ellul makes a simple and compelling point in *The Technological Society*. It is that means tend to swallow up ends. This is said to happen first in the components of a civilization: in religion, in the economy, in the political order, in science, and so on. Then, gradually but inexorably, this technological revolution spreads from the part to the whole until the entire society has become one big technological phenomenon. The idea is dramatic; the empirical evidence is vivid and persuasive; it accords with the common-sense impressions we all have about the times in which we live. Everyone is familiar with organizations that begin life in profound dedication to some sublime goal and gradually mature into a concern with merely maintaining the existence of the organization and preserving the power of its leadership. It is hard to think of any long-established organizations in which this has not occurred. Especially noteworthy examples are to be found in the history of reform churches and revolutionary parties.

So run our immediate assenting reflections on first reading Ellul's book. But it is curious that the illustrations that come most easily to mind concern organizations rather than arts or crafts. Ellul is obviously on the track of something important when he expands the common-sense idea of technology to make it include all human institutions. But does he then lose the common-sense meaning of technology entirely? The fact that the most dramatic illustrations of the thesis arise from our efforts with human beings rather than with our material environment raises a preliminary question as to whether we are not really dealing with general problems of social organization rather than with the special problem of technology. Political sociologists have long pondered the drift toward oligarchical control and bureaucratic structure that besets formal organizations. Maxims about the corrupting influence of power are as old as speculation itself, and the prevention and cure of such diseases of the body politic was the special province of constitutionalism. Of course, Marx had suggested that the aims of constitutionalism would be undercut by the forces of economics. The similarities between Marx and Ellul are striking enough to remind us that it is almost impossible to prove or to disprove such propositions. They may be right; the processes they describe may be autonomous. And yet, there may be many other autonomous processes in society, each with its loyal advocates. We are inundated by a constellation of would-be causative agents, each put forward in a style that is at once aggressive and defensive, reminiscent of what would be called paranoia if found in individuals rather than ideologies. Ellul leaves the reader with so strong a feeling of this methodological paranoia that the impulse to find out where he went wrong in analysis overpowers the enthusiastic assent elicited by his compelling descriptive passages.

Two features obviously require scrutiny: the ends-means inversion and the extension of the idea of technology beyond the arts and crafts. If we are to ask whether it is possible to conceive of a means that cannot become an end in itself, one possible answer immediately presents itself: the case of a technique which, in swallowing up its initial goals, destroys itself as a technique. Moreover, the question may be turned

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

around. Are there goals that swallow up techniques? Does the ends-means inversion run backward as well as forward?

One could say that anarchism is a goal that purports to swallow up means. Anarchism rests on a theory of social action that is nontechnological; it relies upon instinctual and nonrational forces. Anarchism claims that if these forces are not technologically interfered with they will exert themselves beneficially throughout human affairs. Revolutionary general strikes will put down technology and then creative syndics and cooperatives will take over. Anarchism assumes that the result will be harmonious—that the universe has built into it a principle of harmony which will assert itself if left alone. And, while anarchism is a puny soldier to send to battle against Ellul's massive institutional forces, it has some blood brothers that are not so summarily dismissed. Anarchism is a conception similar to the notion of mechanics in classical physics. Suppose one relies entirely upon classical mechanics to produce order in the universe. Would not that be nontechnological? We must say yes; that is, as one of its rigorous proponents once explained, classical mechanics does not require God as a hypothesis. Mechanics, of course, was but a theory, as is the technological imperative under discussion. But mechanics found impressive descriptive verification.

The laissez-faire market was viewed by its expositors as exhibiting principles of mechanics. It was self-creating, self-regulating and self-equilibrating. It follows that the market was nontechnological. It was even anti-technological. It proved that there could not be an efficacious technology for the rational design, control and operation of an economic system. Whatever one's personal position on this matter, it must be admitted that a large number of men of high intelligence regard it as being sound and practicable. So we conclude that in the realms of instinct and mechanics, nontechnological processes can at least be imagined. This leads us to a curiosity found in the technological imperative.

What is it that gives dramatic power to Ellul's technological imperative? How does technology become an autonomous force? What is it that gives it the drive to swallow up ends? How is one to describe the process by which technology overtakes and dominates all human functions? If one looks at this technological phenomenon as a whole it can only be described as an instance of mechanics. Being autonomous, it can spread of its own accord. Now what are we to make of a social order dominated by an autonomous force that swallows up human functions? At the very least, we can say that it is not, strictly speaking, a technological order. Missing is the rationality of means that is embedded in the very name of technology. If, in fact, the entire social order could be operated as a technology, Ellul's dilemma would disappear. The efficacious realization of social goals would be assured. The cure for the ills arising from the proliferation of technologies could be found in submitting them to an overall control technology. This, as we have seen, would be the opposite of a system of mechanics. The curiosity is that the technological imperative makes its inexorable way through human functions on the basis of a principle of mechanics, and yet mechanics is essentially anti-technological.



Mathematical drawings and diagrams courtesy New York Public Library

The spread of technologies brings us to the general problem of designing a technology. For even if the process is inexorable, each novel application of technology requires an initial act of design. The function of designing a technology cannot itself be made into pure technique. If that happened, the act of designing would disappear. Design is novel creation. It is distinguished from technological creation, which is routinized. This being so, if one of the characteristics of a social order is the constant design of new technologies, such an order cannot itself be called technological. It must be as fully nontechnological as it is technology designing. The function of technology design either denies the technological imperative or requires its revision to account for the design function and for the kind of society in which novel design predominates. Ellul suggests that at some point technology closes the door on design and cuts itself off from its generative principle. But if this were to happen, technology could no longer spread.

The whole force of Ellul's argument derives from what is made to appear as technology's inexorable spread. But he cannot have it both ways. The technological force that kills design stunts its own growth by the very same measure. The connection between the design of technologies and their spread brings us to the heart of the matter, the issue on which Ellul stands or falls. This is the proposition that technology spreads not only throughout all manufacturing processes but that it encompasses all other human functions as well. If this is true Ellul brings a powerful message; if not, he gives us little more than some well-classified descriptive material about industrial management and bureaucracy.

And on the other hand, if one reduces the technological imperative to the sole question of whether or not human action is capable of being routinized, then the doctrine of the spread of technology is true but it is also meaningless. Using this meaning of technology it is apparent that there has never been a nontechnological society and that the more primitive the society the more it is the witless captive of the technological imperative. This is so because when societies exist at the bare margin of subsistence, all their institutions must be dominated by the technical problems of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

survival. Eskimo society is an especially dramatic example.

The conventional restriction of the meaning of technology to the making of *things* had the advantage of accounting for much that is distinctive and dehumanizing about modern industrial societies. When the technological idea is expanded to include all other human functions it sacrifices this virtue without acquiring new ones in compensation. We see this when we look beyond the mere fact of routinization and enumerate the different kinds of objects to which human routines may be applied. They are three: things, symbols and people. When subjected to routinization these objects yield crafts, idioms and organizations. The distinctions are necessary even though elements of all three may be present in most actual forms of routinized behavior.

The simplest craft depends for its survival upon some organized group to preserve and transmit it, and that transmission must employ at least some degree of logic. But even so, careful distinctions among these three functions are necessary in order to test the proposition that technology is invading every sphere of life.

What brings these different kinds of functions into existence? In each case it would be an architectonic—a design—operation. The arts and sciences bring new techniques for making things into existence. Logic and mathematics are created through philosophy. Human organizations are created through politics. The making of things cannot become progressive, cannot acquire fuller improvement, self-realization, development and articulation, without the preservation and progressive development of the arts and sciences. Problem solving cannot expand without the growth and development of philosophy. The making of new systems of rules and roles cannot spread and extend itself to larger and more complex operations without the expansion of politics. It is conceivable that a static condition might occur in which none of these departments of culture would grow or develop into new areas. This static condition, rather than the expansive condition Ellul described, would be characterized as a purely technological order. Recall the earlier example of the Eskimos. Every moment of their short, hazardous lives is spent in rigorously controlled technological routines, carefully held in a static divorce from creativity, progressive development and novel principles of design.

An age in which technology is expanding rather than one in which it is static must also be one in which art, science, philosophy and politics are expanding. And in fact they are expanding throughout the world today. Moreover, the prospect for the future seems to promise their further expansion. This follows from the nature of cybernation. Those functions that can be reduced to technological operations are precisely the ones that can be automated. This means that technology is destined to disappear into the computer rather than sweep everything before it. Ellul seems to be not only self-contradictory; he has also managed to get the story of the future backward. But even if this were not so—even if the world could be frozen into pre-cybernated patterns—the technological imperative would stop short at the threshold of symbolic and human systems. Their objects are so different from the objects of craft technologies that the idea of technology cannot be made to encompass them. This is seen by considering the pure technological situation, as for example in the famous Robinson Crusoe predicament.

Crusoe was faced with the necessity of inaugurating the basic survival technologies: tool making, food getting and the maintenance of physical comfort. He did this by devising ways to deal with different elements in his environment. Whether or not he was fully aware of the fact, he had to take advantage of the laws of nature. Technology means designing ways to harness the forces of natural determinism.

Plant a seed, water and cultivate it, and the return will



be 100 to 1. It is a simple routine, a technique of farming, and it will yield enormous profits. There is nothing nature can do about agricultural technologies precisely because it is nature. That is, because it is the captive of a certain degree of determinism that can be technologically harnessed as a windmill harnesses the forces of winds. Agriculture as an example of technology consists of following a routine which, because of the determinism of nature, and to the extent that the expected determinism of nature can be relied upon in fact, will always produce the designed result. Of course, if natural determinism is interfered with, if water fails, if plant diseases strike, or if soil nutrients become depleted, the technique no longer works. The same routines will be of no avail because the natural determinism upon which they depend has somehow been tampered with. They can be rendered effective again only by a "revolution"—some novel act of creativity which redesigns the technology to accommodate the change in natural determinism. So the automaticity of technological results depends not only on the accuracy and precision of design of the technological pattern but also upon the determinism of nature.

How does this apply to symbolic systems? At first thought there seems to be nothing more technological than logic and mathematics. But what is the natural determinism on which they depend for their efficacy? In order for logic to be a technology in the precise sense described for agriculture it must have some instrumental relationship to a natural determinism. There are several possibilities.

Symbols themselves may be regarded as containing an intrinsic determinism. It would follow that a logic is merely the explication of that determinism. But if that is so, symbols are really like plants and animals. Human will has nothing to do with how they turn out. But a problem arises here because a symbol is something created by man. It is an artifact the moment it comes into existence. We are comparing a symbol, such as the number three, with a thing, such as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seed. But that is not the only problem. We are also confronted with a different kind of product. Logic creates a product in the mind. It increases knowledge. The product of grammar, logic and mathematics is education. But the educational experience is like the creative experience rather than the technological experience. It disappears if we make it technological. This would happen if logic were performed as are assembly processes in factories. The performer would not need to understand the meaning of his acts, or why his technology works. Only in such a case could we speak of logic as a technology in the same sense as machine tending. But in such a case it would not be logic. The computer permits us to convert information processing into a technology and to substitute machine tenders for mathematicians. But



again, these machine tenders are not performing logical or mathematical operations, even though the result of their work is to expand rationality enormously. The point is that the educational significance of symbols depends upon their artificial immutability, whereas the technological significance of matter depends upon the plasticity implicit in its determinisms. If we behave technologically toward symbols as we do toward matter, rending the symbol three into the symbol five, we destroy the symbolic idiom.

A second possibility is to regard logic as a principle that is somehow built into the universe as a whole. It is, so to speak, the inner philosophy of the universe. A mathematical discovery would merely make explicit a part of the philosophy of the universe that was always there. This way of thinking is like that of the ancients who hypothesized a logos. Logic is merely the logos made available to the mind through symbols. But if logic is seen in this way it cannot be judged a technology. Whatever else the logos may be, it is not a technology, for it incorporates ends and goals within itself—justice, wisdom, truth, beauty and goodness.

Third, we can regard logic as a matter of convention. It is the rules and the roles that logicians adopt and then decide to obey. But if that is the case, logic again loses the character of a technology and adopts features we associate with politics. We can see this the more clearly if we hypothesize that every human function—let us say every technology—is capable of being mathematicized. This means that it is capable of being reduced to a problem-solving situation. This is the assumption of that branch of applied mathematics known as operations research. Let us assume that it is possible. Let us further assume that the most perfect possible computer has already been built. This would mean we would possess the capacity to solve in practice all problems that in theory were capable of solution. At first glance such a world might appear to be completely technologized. It would contain one big automaton—the computer—with all knowledge inside it. All one need do is ask it questions and it will produce truth.

But then, what *is* this computer? Is it a machine? We know it has certain properties of machines, just as the brain has the properties of a biological organ. But it is not its machineness that defines the computer but rather its special capability of producing solutions. Now this means that no matter how many separate computing machines there might be in existence, they are all parts of the same logical universe, so in effect there is really only one computer. For remember, they are all perfectly designed and they all contain all the knowledge of the world. So it is really knowledge and truth that each one contains. Under this condition if the same problem were posed to each computer, each would always give back the same answer. So it is not really any *individual* computer that is doing anything. It is not really any individual computer that possesses anything. A given computer is merely the vehicle for the revelation of truth. It is, in short, a kind of symbol. It is the biggest and most complete symbol in the universe, but it is symbolic. It is, in effect, the logos. But again, we cannot predicate technological attributes of the logos. We may predicate philosophy, however. One way we might describe this revealed philosophy—this universe of symbol—is through something like the imagery of Teilhard de Chardin. His term for it was noosphere. This is what the computer reveals: our noosphere. Logic is the descriptive name we give to the various parts of the noosphere. Logic, logos, noosphere, but not technology; at least not without distorting technology into something quite un-Ellulian.

Our third candidate for technological status was politics. Here also, we need a pure example. Let us assume, as Graham Wallas once did, that a perfectly functioning Friends meeting might provide such an example. At this meeting, to suppose further, a decision has been taken to engage in a peace demonstration. The time, place and manner is established. The order of march is arranged, the songs to be sung are selected; those who will provide food, those who will speak to the press, and what will be done in the event of arrest are all provided for in advance. The result is the production of a series of designed, agreed upon, patterned rules of conduct and roles of behavior.

Now compare this process and product with our first category, the technology of making things. Determinism is lacking in two ways. In the first place it is lacking with regard to results. Even if everything proceeds precisely as planned there is no guarantee that the political authorities will react in the desired fashion. Politics is not like the cultivation of seeds. Everything may be done perfectly and still there may be no fruit. And this indeterminism of effect is known in advance. In fact, there may be a prior conviction that the demonstration will not bear fruit. In this case we

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may speak of the "myth" of the demonstration; that somehow a fruitless demonstration is the right thing to do regardless of the practical result. Even if the result is completely unpredictable, it is the myth that the action is virtuous that sustains the participants, rather than any expected practical result. Such behavior cannot be called technological in any sense of the term intended by Ellul. But an ineradicable element of myth inhabits all political action.

The second way in which determinism is here lacking is possibly more important. It concerns the indeterminism of the performers who have agreed to produce the action—the integrated system of roles which is the concrete substance of this piece of politics. Our example has not been a case of studying in advance the built-in behavioral determinism of these people and then manipulating them accordingly. That may be what is popularly meant by politics. It may be all that Ellul means by politics. But it is not the situation we are dealing with and it does not even come into the definition of politics as we have used the term. In politics one is always dealing with a group of individuals who are self-determining—that is, political. They decide to act according to a plan they have invented and of which they approve. That is what happens in legislation. It is only by individually deciding to adopt the allotted rules and roles that the plan—the prospective political event—can be realized. This means that the determinism characteristic of a political event is not intrinsic to the individual natures of the participants—not ineradicable, as is the germination rate of seeds. It is something that their natures have adopted, and they could have adopted a different plan and followed different roles. In political action human beings impose a determinism upon themselves and that determinism—that law—is the plan.

Compare this political plan with the technological plan previously described. The former exploited a known natural determinism. The latter is a plan which itself embodies the putative determinism ultimately to be exhibited by the synchronized actions of all participants. In both cases there is law. In both cases the law expresses determinism. In the first case one creates a technology capable of exploiting the determinism. In the second case one creates the determinism and then attempts to realize the rules and roles embodied in it. But their realization *is in* their performance. The act of creativity is similar in politics and in drama. It consists of playing out the roles properly; of doing through choice and rational designs what nature does through determinism.

In an extreme form we may speak of excessively legalistic behavior. Perhaps the most famous example of legalistic behavior is that of the Biblical Pharisees. Their goal was to live a holy life. It was defined as a life of ritual purity and was insured by strict adherence to the law. But this adherence to law was a knowing, self-imposed and self-conscious conformity. Otherwise it lost its meaning. This was the way one produced and exhibited virtue. No ritual is merely instrumental; it is also intrinsically holy. "The outward and obvious sign of an inward and spiritual grace." Ritual is symbol but it is also holy; just as politics is symbolic action (roles according to rules) but it also *is* justice, in the sense that it is just for all to obey the law. But if this is the case neither one can be a technology, for instrumentality and agency rather than goodness in itself is the distinguishing quality of a technology. If we try to argue that there is no difference between a food-growing technology and a holy ritual, because the holy ritual is a "technique" for producing holiness, we see that our error is fundamental. Ritual is not a means of producing something else. It *is*; it embodies the goal desired. Ritual is the opposite of technology. It brings ends into means.

What is the counter response? Can one reply that the practitioner merely *believes* that a ritual embodies holiness, and that from an objective standpoint it is no different from any other technology? But the point is that there cannot be an objective standpoint. *We* may not believe that someone else's ritual embodies the holy; on that basis, and that basis only, we say it is a technology. But this cannot be true of the believer, for if he didn't believe in the ritual's intrinsic holiness he would not observe it. The moment it becomes instrumental, that is to say, technological, it ceases to inspire his adherence.

Turn the question around. A technology does not depend upon our belief; it works regardless of belief. No behavior which inspires our adherence only as long as we believe it

to embody holiness, virtue or justice can be a technology. This means that the third category of technology must be viewed in a fuller light. Human organization can never really be technological. If the technological invasion were to occur, organization as such would cease to exist.

To this point we have distinguished four kinds of processes that are so qualitatively different from technology that wherever they are present the technological imperative is inapplicable. They are: mechanics (technology may take advantage of and exploit mechanics, but the process itself is nontechnological), design, philosophy and politics. In at least two places the argument went a little further and even suggested that the contemporary world might be moving in a direction opposite from that charted by Ellul. For technology requires a sophisticated symbolic environment. It contains an intrinsic symbolic imperative. This symbolic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

component is fully as characteristic of a technological order as is the ends-means inversion.

Every technology tends to produce its own symbolic transformation. It follows that a technological revolution produces a symbolic revolution. Again, let us take a simple example. The art of building a house is a manual art. It involves the crafts of carpentry and masonry performed by artisans. These crafts become technologies. We can describe their technological elements. We can preserve these arts in guilds, or write them down in books. One day someone may begin to apply philosophy to the technology. Such a one asks not only how to do something but how to do it well, so that it is good and beautiful. He asks that the craft be subordinated to principles of goodness and beauty. He goes on. He asks not only how the art is performed but why it works. That is, he seeks for whatever truth there may be implicit in it. He wants a theory of the art. What he does is to abstract the elementary principles from the technology and then he formulates a theory of their operation so designed that one can work out in symbol all that is needed to make a plan that can be followed by a technologist.

Now we have something new, which we call architecture. We have a profession rather than a craft. This is a symbolic transformation of the technology of making buildings and it is devoted to different aims than was the technology from which it was drawn. It aims at beauty, goodness, wisdom and truth. Nonetheless, we can say that its principles are implicit in the original technology and that such principles are implicit in every technology. However, they must be discovered and their science must be invented by men. It is not claimed that all sciences have been produced in this fashion, but many have. Professions certainly have. The point is that a science and a profession are implicit in a technology in the same way that a technology is implicit in an art. This implication is being realized in the contemporary Western world at a furious rate. It is the process of the scientific revolution. Ellul is just one revolution too late. Technological transformation was the process of the industrial revolution. Symbolic transformation is the process of the scientific revolution. All the old technologies are in the process of acquiring their architectures—their principles of goodness, beauty, wisdom and truth—their "symbolic imperatives." But recalling the earlier argument about logic and philosophy, it is clear that to the extent that this is true it is also true that our times possess a kind of functional telos issuing in a drive toward the articulation of philosophy. The symbolic imperative active in each technology works toward its progressive subordination to philosophy and politics. This is merely another way of stating a contemporary commonplace — that world order and planning are the twin imperatives of our times. It also confirms what Teilhard described as man's expanding symbolic environment, what he called the noosphere.

We are far from being locked into a world helplessly dominated by a technological imperative. That very imperative, merely in articulating itself, turns into a symbolic imperative. In the end there is an even deeper implication that is profoundly architectonic. For the general symbolic idiom implied by the various separate systems is politics, the architectonic science. Ellul has unwittingly achieved a curious result. He has given us a foundation for concluding that the world is on the verge of a new flowering of political philosophy. To the extent that his facts are right, his fears are groundless. The only thing that might prevent the consummation of the symbolic revolution would be some contrary process capable of inhibiting the full articulation of technologies. But that would be the opposite of the empirical condition Ellul finds in the world.

But merely to point out inadequacies and errors in Ellul's explanation says little or nothing about what he is trying to explain. Why is it that we feel the problem Ellul is concerned about is a real one even though his approach to it is wrong? It is at this point that Max Born joins the list of cosmic pessimists. He is concerned about the same problem. Born says that the modern world is one in which it is impossible for actions to be influenced by ethical and moral values. The culprit is not technology but science. Here we have a much more formidable adversary. Max Born claims that the necessary end product of the scientific revolution—the revolution in which science acquired power in measure for the power it bestowed—is the separation of actions from their ethical implications. The great example is the atomic bomb. The roster of those involved is a directory of giants: Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Fermi, Szilard, and dozens more. "We have gathered here the greatest collection of crackpots the world has ever seen," said General Groves to his staff on the eve of the Manhattan Project.

It was a project the scientists had initiated themselves. The story of the initial letter to Roosevelt from Einstein, Szilard and Wigner is part of the world's imperishable folklore. Less well known is the story of the second letter sent after the collapse of Germany and recommending that the project be abandoned. It lay unattended on Roosevelt's desk the day of his death. In retrospect, the scientists involved confess they had few moral qualms about the bomb in the beginning. The need to defeat Hitler was paramount. The fear that he might be building the bomb was enough to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quiet any qualms. A man like Hitler would never refuse to use the bomb on ethical grounds; the only thing to deter such a monster would be fear of reprisal, though it was never explained how the deterrent was to be made credible without first showing what our bomb could do against an actual target. This question that was begged at the start remained to devour the ethical problem at the end. The connection between ethics and action was first stretched and finally severed entirely. Even worse was another facet of the scientific revolution revealed by the bomb. The full ethical implications of a scientific endeavor may not become apparent until many years after its consummation. This is not the fault of the scientist but it is his special burden.

Of course it has always been true that an action in the present may have unforeseeable harmful effects in the future. The invention of the automobile is the most fashionable illustration. Science raises this separation to a new level. For the more profound an innovation and the more universal its applications, the more difficult it is to forecast its effects. This was Max Born's point and it was clear that the bomb was the chief example he had in mind.

Ellul, while speaking of the same result, had attributed it to institutional forces rather than to the limits of perception. Born's proposition is simply that in order for morality to find realization in action it must be possible to perceive the consequences of action. Science is the culprit rather than technology. Science has destroyed ethics—not because of the familiar complaint that the processes and conceptions of science are ethically neutral—positivism is simply not at issue. The culprit is both simpler and more elusive. It is the objective situation in which we all find ourselves as a result of the scientific revolution.

In the 1930s two economists, Berle and Means, made an elaborate statistical and legal analysis of the modern American corporation and proved that ownership had become deprived of control. Recently, some economists have carried this further, describing the virtual disappearance of ownership as a significant factor in economics. A post-ownership—"para-proprietal"—society would be the result. Born raises an analogous question about the separation of action from effects. He asks about a post-ethical society.

What is true of ethics applies also to politics. The world of the scientific revolution has become so complex that only men of general wisdom and knowledge can run it properly. But its problems are so specialized that the generalist cannot understand them. The experts and scientists who do understand lack the general knowledge made politically necessary by the discord produced by their proliferating specialties. But this means that politics as the architectonic discipline is rendered impossible, and we must ponder not only the problem of a post-ethical but also that of a post-political world. Both problems concern the special insufficiencies of perception resulting from science. This means that the solution can be approached in two ways—by controlling science or by enhancing perception.

Scientists are no happier about proposals to control science than are businessmen about proposals to control business. Their defenses are remarkably similar: business (science) is what made the modern world great; to interfere with business (science) will inevitably destroy our most



precious liberty. And even though the scientist finds a more receptive audience than the businessman, it is not apparent that his case is better. The issue is not that of foisting dictatorial controls on thought processes, it is the perennial issue of the rule of law. All freedoms must be constitutionalized in order to be assured, and it is merely the constitutionalization of science that is at issue. The military, the state and the economy previously have come up for constitutionalization; now it is the turn of science. We are, after all, just at the threshold of the scientific revolution. It is really up to us to decide at what rate this revolution will proceed, where its sway will carry and how it will be consolidated. A large part of the problem of a society that has become ethically and politically dysfunctional could be solved through the determined political control of science —building ethics and justice in at the top, so to speak.

The other side of the problem remains: the improvement of human perception. All finite things have their limits; there is no reason to think the human brain is an exception. But, as Pierre Auger has pointed out, one thing no animal can perceive directly is his own perceptual limitations. If he could, that act of perception would constitute a removal of the limit. We furnish a clever chimpanzee with a disassembled rod and he perceives that the food outside his cage may be reached by a simple act of mechanical assembly. As we make the tool progressively more complex we reach the chimpanzee's limit of perception. He is not only unable to solve the problem; he is unable to perceive the presence of a potential tool in the complex parts furnished him. He begins to go through aimless repetitive cycles.

The same thing could be true of the human being. Man could have come to the limit of his perceptual abilities in several areas without the slightest awareness of having done so. For if he could perceive that fact directly, the act of perception would remove the limit and replace it with a potentially solvable problem. What might be the indirect

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



evidence that human perceptive limits had been reached? Perhaps it would be various counterparts of the aimless, repetitive cycles referred to in the chimpanzee. This would accord with the behavior of those with impaired and deranged brains. Regarding the human species as a whole, one thinks immediately of cycles of economic depression and of the cyclical theories of history.

Suppose we press this matter of the limit of human perception a bit further. Where would such limits appear and where would they not? Immediately we can distinguish between two different types of apperceptive behavior: that for which collective and accumulative knowledge provides the foundation and that in which each individual (or each collectivity) must start from the beginning. The first would include areas such as mathematics and science. Each generation stands upon the shoulders of its predecessors, and the process is cumulative. There may come a limit to how far science can progress but it does not appear to be near.

The second type of apperceptive behavior would be best illustrated by ethics and politics (conceived broadly), for these are areas in which each individual either imbibes traditions unthinkingly or is forced to start from the beginning and learn each lesson and precept for himself. One cannot take the ethical solution another man has found satisfactory and apply it to the solution of one's own ethical problems as one would apply a newly discovered scientific formula. If political knowledge were cumulative, the problem of achieving the rule of law would have to be solved only once in history. Instead, political wisdom being noncumulative, its lessons must be learned and applied anew with pain and violence each time the principles of civic order must be extended to a new level.

Theoretical proof has almost none of the significance for politics that it has for science and mathematics. Science must be distinguished from politics just as earlier it was set apart from technology. And the reason is ultimately the same. There are many things about people that are like atoms and integers, and for such areas science is certainly applicable. But politics is not such an area because its laws provide the sources of determinism rather than the description of them. This makes it almost impossible for men to visualize in advance how a new law—a political innovation—might work out. It would be something like trying to visualize in advance how a universe based upon different physical properties might work. But this locks societies into a circle of conservatism, because they will resist adopting an innovation until they can be certain in advance that it will work. That is why political perception becomes so strongly circumscribed that men are inhibited from devising political solutions to novel problems until they are forced to do so by outright crisis. When novel problems arise at a leisurely pace this disparity may not be too troublesome, but one of the political meanings of the scientific revolution is that novel problems requiring major political innovations will arise with increasing frequency and severity. The disparity between our ability to produce and our ability to solve political problems seems destined to reach the state of endemic, generalized political crisis.

What is the conclusion? We conceive of an objective foundation for the separation of morality from action and of organization from justice. Science, being cumulative, poses progressively more complex ethical and political problems, but ethics and politics, being noncumulative, face a rapidly growing disparity between the problems they can solve and those with which they are confronted. The outlook is most pessimistic. Civilization would appear to be doomed, like the bewildered chimpanzee, to aimless, cyclical behavior. Except that now the tools in the cage are so highly destructive that man can't possibly survive in an environment of endemic cyclical crisis.

What is the solution? It must come through concerted efforts in the realm of cultural—ethical and political—apperception: a crash program to see that man's symbolic environment is maintained in the proper ecological balance; a revolution in education to take maximum advantage of the human life span devoted to noncumulative departments of perception. It is here and not in science that we must invest more time and effort. This is the educational imperative that is implicit in the symbolic revolution wrought by contemporary science. In the end, the true solution may come only when science has succeeded in extending life expectancy in the human being by fifty years or so. We may already have produced a dysfunctional culture, one in which the congenital biological limits of its members prevent them from coping with the demands of their cultural environment.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How Much Science Can We Afford?

LORD BOWDEN

London

Because of the rate at which institutions grow in our society, processes which have gone on steadily for centuries may have to stop quite suddenly and quite soon, and policies that we have been able to follow for decades may have to be scrapped at great cost in spiritual anguish, and perhaps at the price of great economic upheavals. Many of our traditional ideas have simultaneously and abruptly become obsolete, and we do not know how to adapt ourselves to the new situation. The problems thus urgently presented by growth appear broadly in society, but for this essay I shall dwell particularly on those associated with science and the science-based industries, and with the educational systems on which they depend.

The demand for electricity in Britain has doubled every nine or ten years since 1900; in other words, it has increased at about 8 per cent compound interest for more than sixty years. Such doubling and redoubling in equal intervals of time is termed by mathematicians and scientists an exponential growth.

The problems of exponential growth are familiar enough to the designers of atomic bombs, and they are well known to all biologists. Bacteria in soup or greenfly on a rose bush will increase in the same uncontrollable way as long as resources are there for them. All such growth curves straighten out after a time, and then they usually flatten off or decline. The population of the earth will probably double before the end of the century. If it doubled every thirty years for another 300 years, each human being would have only a few square feet to stand on. We all know that our standard of living, and indeed the possibility of living at all on the earth, will depend on the rapid introduction of effective methods of limiting the population.

But this is not my main theme. The number of practicing scientists in the world seems to double every ten years or so; in fact, of all the scientists who have ever lived, three-quarters are alive and practicing their profession today. Furthermore, of all the scientific knowledge in the world, two-thirds has been discovered since the Second World War.

It has been true to say that "three-quarters of all the scientists who ever lived are alive today" at any time during the past 200 years. But today we can see for the first time that a long continued process of growth must be coming to an end. For more than 200 years scientists were everywhere an insignificant minority of the population. In Britain today they outnumber both the clergy and the officers of the armed forces. If the rate of progress which has been maintained ever since the time of Sir Isaac Newton continued for another 200 years, every man, woman and child on earth would be a scientist, and so would every horse, cow, dog and mule as well. It cannot go on like this much longer. What will limit the growth of science and the number of scientists?

No one knows how many people could study science if the opportunity were given to them. At the moment about 5 per cent of the young people in Britain go to university, and half of them study science or technology; the number has doubled in the last decade, but I don't think that we need worry *yet* about the supply of potential scientists of moderate competence. Bragg has asserted that Britain produces an average of one really good physicist per million of the population per annum, but we must remember the not quite so good, who come in much greater numbers, and we must educate more of them and fit them for this modern world. Half the 20 year olds went to college in California in 1964, and in America they talk of the possibility that 20 per cent of their adult population may have Ph.D.s by 1990. (I don't think they really mean it.)

We may be very short of scientists in a few years' time and there are those who believe that by making pure science so attractive we have deprived industry of men it badly needs. But there are other important limits on the growth of science which we shall feel suddenly and soon. Our whole modern society and all our industries depend on the growth of science; until recently the total cost of science was almost insignificant, but if science doesn't stop growing soon it will bankrupt the community.

When I was a student with Lord Rutherford in the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge in the early 1930s, the whole budget which that great man had at his disposal for research was about £2,500 a year. No wonder he used to admonish his students and say: "We have no money to spend, so we shall have to think." With this miserably inadequate sum he laid the foundations of modern nuclear physics and of our whole nuclear power program. No fewer than eight of his colleagues were Nobel Prize winners. Never again will so many Nobel Prize winners be so cheaply maintained. In 1964 the Cavendish Laboratory spent about £300,000.

High-energy nuclear physics has become so expensive that no single university anywhere in the world can afford the enormous machines that are needed to study the ultimate structure of matter. The Rutherford Laboratory in Harwell cost £6 million last year, and the jointly sponsored laboratories of CERN in Geneva spent about £9 million.

The end is not in sight. The CERN machine has a magnet half a mile round, which is positioned everywhere to a few thousandths of an inch. Particles travel round and round for a total distance as far as from the earth to the moon as they accelerate. There is talk of another machine twice as big to be finished soon in Russia, of another six times as big to be built somewhere in America, and European scientists are planning a machine ten times as big as the machine in Geneva—it will cost several billion dollars to build and run. Design studies for an even bigger machine have begun. Can we afford it, now or ever?

Every country produces more scientists every year, and every scientist costs more to equip than his predecessors did. On the other hand, no country has been able to increase its gross national product at much more than a

An expanded version of Lord Bowden's essay, based on a paper he delivered to the European Institute of Business Administration, appeared in *New Scientist*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quarter of the rate at which it has increased expenditure on science. America is spending more today on research and development than the whole of the federal budget before Pearl Harbor. If the figure goes on mounting at its present rate America will be spending 10 per cent of its GNP on research and development by 1973—and twice its GNP by the year 2000. Our improving standard of living could never have been achieved if we and our ancestors before us had not invested so heavily in science and the science-based industries. The new national economic plans suggest that the demand for scientists, technologists and technicians will grow twice as fast as that for administrators and clerical officers—four times as fast as the national average. But how much longer can we afford to let science go on growing as it has grown since the time of Newton?

Furthermore, the schools which educate our young people for the scientific age are becoming more and more expensive—they need more and more staff, and the children are staying at school much longer than they used to do. For example, the average age at which students graduate as Ph.D.s and leave the university has increased steadily since the war. The trend is more obvious in America and on the Continent than it is in Britain. In Germany and Holland a disquieting number of men are students until 30. The average age of retirement seems to be falling steadily. The two curves will intersect in 1995, at which point will scientists retire immediately upon graduation?

The dilemma which confronts us is quite plain. We believe, as no other civilization has ever done before us, in the all-important role of science to the community; we know (and no one has ever known this before) that science has grown steadily for 200 years or more, but *we* have to decide not whether, but when, this steady exponential expansion must be stopped. Expenditure on pure research has been doubling every five years. Many administrators, and almost all the scientists I have talked to, hope and expect that we shall double our expenditure again, though we shall probably take more than five years to do it; many people hope that we shall double it for a second time before 1985, but I know very few people who expect that we shall be able to double our present rate of expenditure more than three times in the foreseeable future.

Herodotus tells us that Pharaoh used 100,000 men for twenty years to build his Pyramid, that he sold his daughter to buy some of the stones, and that the whole enterprise devastated Egypt as badly as a major war.

St. Peter's was built "*ad majorem dei gloriam.*" It embodies man's sense of communion with the infinite, its construction added immeasurably to the prestige of the Church. It expresses the spirit of the age, quite superbly. But the bill nearly bankrupted the papacy—it was financed by the sale of indulgences which provoked the wrath of Luther, and led to the growth of the Protestant churches. CERN was built to help men probe the profoundest secrets of nature; its construction taxed the engineering and scientific skill of some of the ablest men of their generation. It has added greatly to the reputation and prestige of those who built and used it. It expresses the spirit of this age of ours. The whole bill has still to be paid. It may deprive many a British university of funds it urgently needs, and lead to the stoppage of very promising lines of research.

No one has ever built a bigger pyramid than Cheops or a longer wall than Shi Hwang Ti, or a bigger palace than Diocletian, or a greater cathedral than St. Peter's. Before long we shall have to decide if the world is ever to see a bigger telescope than George Ellery Hale's on Mount Palomar, which was designed thirty years ago, has dominated astronomy ever since the war, and made modern cosmology possible. Shall we ever need a bigger steerable radio telescope than Lovell's in Jodrell Bank, or a bigger proton accelerator than those John Adams built in CERN and G. K. Green built in Brookhaven, or a bigger linear electron accelerator than W. K. H. Panofsky's in Stanford, which is reputed to cost more to operate than the whole of the rest of the great university which houses the machine? Our funds, may I repeat it, are limited.

I must pursue the analogy a little further. How many modern scientists have convinced themselves that they are now the heirs of creation, that society owes them a living and must provide them with the facilities they need to further their researches? The men who built the Great Pyramids, the ancient monasteries and cathedrals, the palaces and museums and art galleries of Europe, all had the same expectations. In fact the world owes a living to no one who does not earn it, and whose efforts have no economic significance. Intellectual achievements may be rewarding to the individuals, and vitally important to society, but they must be judged on their merits; no man must be the sole judge of his own cause.

Gibbon once remarked that in the 18th century all religions were considered by the people as equally true, by the philosophers as equally false, and by the magistrates as equally useful. Price has told us that today all sciences are considered by their professors as equally significant, by the politicians as equally incomprehensible, and by the treasury as equally expensive.

Our classical scholars and some other members of faculties of arts used to despise the scientists who were trying to make themselves academically respectable. It was a dean of Christ Church who claimed: "The advantages of a classical education are twofold. It allows us to look with contempt upon those who have not shared its advantages, and it fits us for places of emolument, both in this world and in that which is to come." Science is now respectable in all our universities. The attitude of some scientists to engineers, technologists, administrators and social scientists has been lukewarm at best, but let us hope, now that the importance of scientists and technologists to society has at last been recognized, that these important and influential men will be more tolerant of innovation than their old opponents were for a century or more.

The unbounded ambitions of the aristocracy and of the clergy became so great that common men rebelled and destroyed them. President Eisenhower found it necessary to warn his countrymen of the growing power of the scientists and of the great corporations which are exploiting the space age. It seems almost inevitable to me that the Russian Government must be having the same kind of administrative problems in controlling its space program. The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration is already deploying resources which might feed and clothe half the undeveloped world. It is attracting engineers and technologists from the undeveloped countries which need

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



them and cannot spare them, and it is producing a world-wide drift of men which we in Britain have come to call the "brain drain."

In science as in other things, death will be the price of life. But who signs the death warrants? Ten years ago I asked Dr. Stratton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, what was the most difficult and important of his tasks. He said, without any hesitation or doubt, "to devise techniques for closing things down." And this, remember, was in the largest and wealthiest school of science and technology in the world.

We shall have to divide our unprecedentedly large but limited resources among all the claimants more carefully than we have ever done before, and we shall do so knowing as we do it that our decisions will affect not only the scientific health of the community but almost certainly the growth of our industries, and even our national survival. We must do so knowing full well that scientific progress always has been unpredictable and that it always will be, and that the man in government can never hope to know as much about the projects he is saving or condemning as the young men in the laboratories who will have to depend for their professional lives upon his judgment.

For the first time in history administrators will be among the most important men in the world of science. They are already all-powerful in America and they will soon be at work in every Western country. Their power to shape the future will increase the ascendancy of the Executive over the legislature, which is already alarming to many people. They must be watched—but by whom? The only men who can understand and control the growth of science are scientists, but there are very few of them who understand but have no personal and private interest in the results of government policy. The decisions made by scientific administrators will probably be more important than any others made by either civil servants or politicians. Great issues will inevitably depend on new scientific discoveries and scientific policies which are too complicated for laymen to comprehend; our future will be influenced by scientific discoveries which cannot be foreseen, much more than it is by political dogma, however sacred.

There are many who wonder if our parliament can exercise effective control over this vital component of national policy. If war is too important to trust to the generals, who should look after science?

We may take comfort from American experience. Just as we tend to assume that a good administrator can run anything and learn technical details from his subordinates, Americans assume that any good scientist can administer, or get his administration done for him by his staff; all that matters is his ability to hold his own with his professional peers—no professional administrator could do this. Perhaps both countries are right up to a point!

The components of our economy which are growing most rapidly are the science-based industries. For example, electronics grew by about 32 per cent between 1963 and 1964, a rate which was eight times the national average. Our industrial laboratories have to recruit men who have been doing pure research in university and condition them to believe that applied research, upon which the profits of industry depend, is interesting and worth doing. Some firms have gone so far as to establish laboratories in which they attempt to reorient their young men. This process is expensive and difficult and is made harder by the reluctance of our own universities to take a proper interest in industrial problems.

There is a shortage of engineering students in Britain for the first time since the war—and in Germany and America. The claims which have been made for the "purity" of science research have persuaded teachers everywhere that engineering is in some way inferior and unworthy of their best pupils. Science and technology have so much in common that many men can be equally successful in a laboratory or a factory. We have not enough of such men. Until we educate more of them we cannot allow too many to escape from industry for the whole of their lives.

Should we favor the applied sciences as a matter of deliberate policy, if necessary, at the expense of the pure science upon which, in the end, the whole system depends? Is our rapid development of pure science depriving industry of too many men who would be valuable engineers? Men who could help British industry earn a living in the markets of the world have become scientists whose contributions to our economy will not be noticed for decades—if indeed they ever have any effect at all.

We ask ourselves anxiously if expenditure on research has to grow five times as fast as the gross national product, out of which science must be paid for. Could we increase the GNP by concentrating our resources and our best men on problems which we expect to be immediately useful to industry? If we did this for a few years should we then

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be so much wealthier that we could spend even more on pure science? What is the time lag in the machine? The time which has to elapse before a new laboratory experiment is embodied in a commercial product is less today than it was fifty years ago, but if pure science stopped growing exponentially in Britain in 1970, would our own industry notice anything before 1980—or 1990?

We shall have to consider, as the Americans have done, if we must try to establish "Centers of Excellence." Many academics would like to insist that our limited funds are shared more or less equally among all claimants. This may be "fair," but in fact the secret of efficiency is to concentrate resources in a few big institutions, or in a few good departments, wherever they may be. We must contemplate the idea of reinforcing success, and we must not quail at the implications of what has sometimes been described as the "principle of maximum unfairness."

Pure science can be done anywhere in the world, it can be done in great international laboratories, and its results become known to all the scientists in the world almost at once. It is the one really international enterprise of our times, and its practitioners are as free as the medieval clergy to wander about the world. But industrial development depends on applied science which must have been done on the spot, and which may depend on local conditions, local ores, local resources and local markets. For a century or more American industry depended on innovation inspired by pure research which had been done in Europe. Today most of the best science in the world is done in America, if only because so many of the essential tools of the scientist are so expensive, and European industry has become dependent on American science since the war in much the same way as American industry depended on European science from the time of Waterloo to the Battle of Britain.

The growth of American industry in the 19th century shows beyond doubt that a country can become enormously rich without a vast program of pure science. The time is long past when Europe can afford to undertake pure scientific research for the whole world. No one disputes its value or its significance for our society or for the world, but we have to decide if the intellectual and educational value of our own scientific research is enough to justify its cost. Is it true that it provides the best way of training young men for industry and the professions? There are those who say it is the only really satisfactory preparation for industry. Are they right? Should we finance high-energy nuclear physics and optical astronomy in the same way and for the same reasons as we finance the opera and the theatre, our orchestras and the ballet? All of them are essential and delightful components of our national life. Apart from its economic significance, can we really claim more for science than the rest? Until recently we spent much more on the arts than we did on science. How times have changed!

I have come to believe that the most important and valuable of all America's assets is to be found in the traditions of her great Land Grant Universities which were established by the Morrill Act, signed by President Lincoln in 1862, in the middle of the Civil War, just after the battle of Gettysburg. The new foundations were inspired by ideas which first appeared in Lancashire but came to fruition in New England. The basic principle is simple. A university should study any or all of the problems of contemporary society. Agriculture, the mechanical arts, medicine, business — all were in their turn important, each was studied and all were taught to students young and old. The astonishing flowering of American universities and their post-graduate schools springs from this tradition. Pure science came late to American universities.

We have just founded a couple of business schools in Britain. We need them. But far more urgently do we need the tradition which led inevitably to their creation in America when first they were needed seventy years ago. Our own academies have been lamentably unwilling to concede the intellectual value and the social significance of applied science and of many other disciplines. Although we all accept the fact that pure science has led to some of the most wonderful new intellectual developments of our time, and we can wholeheartedly admire our pure scientists for their skill and their brilliance, we must at the same time remind them and ourselves that society can justify the expense of providing them with the resources and equipment they use only if they do something in return. They must teach and stimulate young men, and they must be able and willing to turn their minds to the complex and perhaps insoluble problems of the day. The interaction between industry, science and the rest of society is infinitely complex, and no man can ignore the obligations which come with his privileges. This idea is far more clearly understood in America than it is here, and it has done much to make America rich and great.

Symbiosis between their government, their industries and their universities is complete. The government expects the universities to study problems which are important to the nation, and the universities expect lavish support from the federal government. A visitor finds it hard to be sure if the university dons have taken over Washington, or whether the central administration has taken over the universities. The system is complex and confusing, but most effective. We should study it and perhaps adapt it to our very different traditions and institutions.

If the world of science is chaos, roughly organized, it will be essential to avoid too great a tidiness in the administrative machine which controls it. I look forward to the day when every big firm and every department of state which has problems to solve is able and willing to approach individual universities—individual professors if need be—and sponsor a program of pure or applied research. Lest it be thought that this procedure would lead to the complete breakdown of the administrative machine, I must remark that there are no fewer than *five* large independent government agencies which sponsor research in American universities, as well as a dozen big private foundations and scores of small ones. This variety and apparent confusion has in fact been essential to the growth of American science. The medical research of the Rockefeller Foundation is world famous. The income of the Ford Foundation is greater than that of our University Grants Committee, and its dollar reserves are greater than those of the sterling bloc. It has initiated vast and important educational experiments. The Nuffield Foundation has sponsored much of the best contemporary work

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in this field in Britain. Without the help of Ford and Nuffield, education in the English-speaking world would still be in the horse-and-buggy era. Diversity and variety have been more than the spice of life. They have been the secret of conception, parturition and growth. Coordination, and administrative efficiency, can all too easily become the enemies of morale, and destroy the initiative and creative powers of individuals and research establishments. But some coordination we must have.

It is remarkable that trends in science are universal and world-wide; the same subjects seem to become popular, or fall out of favor, everywhere at once. The science community is very closely knit. Scientific fashions seem to be as inexplicable as the success of the Beatles, who appeal at the same moment to young people in Europe, in America and in Russia, and even in Indonesia. No central administration could possibly have foreseen such a fashion, no government could have inspired it, and it seems as if no government can stop it. All that the government can do about scientific fashions is deny some of its scientists the funds that they want, and if it does this some of these distinguished and important men will fold up their tents like Arabs, and as silently steal away.

The government must decide most complex and embarrassing problems. We do not really know if the education we are providing is suitable for men who are to manage the new world we are so busily creating. Does a university unfit a man for some parts of commerce and industry? If so, where are the recruits for these industries (which may be very important) to come from?

Almost every institution in the country tries to improve its efficiency. Schools and universities on the other hand do their best to improve what they call their "staff/student ratio." By this they mean—though they never say it explicitly—that they try to reduce the number of graduates who are educated every year per member of staff. This is done (so we are told) in the interests of staff and students, but it seems to me that the interests of the community demand that we shall have to adopt all the techniques which will help a limited number of staff educate an increasing number of students. These problems are on us now—they cannot wait. We must use big lecture theatres, television, films, as well as small tutorial groups. Our system of lecturing has scarcely altered since before the invention of printing. I think that we could enormously improve the efficiency of our educational machine. The idea of "cost effectiveness" must become familiar to the whole academic world, as it has never been before.

I must try to summarize future trends as best I can see them. The exponential growth of science and the science-based industries, which has been observed for so long, must inevitably give place to a more regular and linear rate of growth. Science will, as it were, begin to grow at simple interest instead of compound interest. After a few more years—unless the national economic plan succeeds beyond our expectations—this growth may itself be slowed down. If the growth of science is halted too quickly, in a short-sighted attempt to save money, then it seems to me to be inevitable that our whole economic growth will grind to a halt in a few years, whatever the planners may do.

If all goes well, I think that we shall have two or three times as many scientists in Britain by 1985 as we have today, but their number will be increasing relatively slowly. Their equipment will be better and their output will be greater than it has ever been before, but thereafter knowledge will grow steadily and regularly but not exponentially. The average income of the population, which will depend even more on science than it does today, will grow steadily for as long as one can foresee.

Ours is not the only economy which will grow. One of the most important questions which face us in the Western world is the probable growth of the developing countries, particularly India and China. China is the biggest country in the world and it is the least known to us in the West. Its people are numerous and intelligent, and hard working. Its civilization is ancient and for thousands of years its achievements surpassed anything the West could show. In the last few years it has begun to industrialize itself and to educate its people.

It seems reasonable to suppose that in the next thirty-five years (until the year 2000) China will be able to do as much as Russia did in the past forty-five years (since 1920 when its economic advance began). Russia is now making about 800 pounds of steel per annum per head of the population. China may have a population of 1,000 million and manufacture 400 million tons of steel a year before the century is out. This is twice as much as the U.S., Russia and the United Kingdom made between them in 1964. China will once again be one of the greatest powers in the world.

If we assume, as I think we must, that scientific ability is equally likely to occur among the people of all races, then the time must come when scientific leadership will pass to the most populous societies, and China will probably lead the scientific world again in the 21st century, as it may have done for the first thousand years of our era.



Upsala College
Library
East Orange, N.J.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & THE ARTS

Outside the Kingdom of the Middle Class

LA VIDA. *By Oscar Lewis. Random House. 669 pp. $10.*

ELMER BENDINER
Mr. Bendiner, writer and editor, is the author of The Bowery Man (*Thomas Nelson*).

To the bigot or the puritan, the desperately poor present no emotional problem. It is clear to them that poverty is the consequence of some character flaw, probably due to an ethnic taint. The liberal, however, often is moved to love—though it sometimes seems like pity—and to a firm conclusion that, given proper diet, housing, playgrounds and schooling, the poor can be qualified to enter the kingdom of middle-class values to which, it is assumed, all humans aspire.

The achievements of the liberals—though eminently praiseworthy in themselves—have not always accomplished the great transformation. It is embarrassing to a reformer to find that new housing projects quickly become skyscraper slums, and that when a trickle of affluence sweeps down to the lowest strata of society it sometimes enables a slum dweller to feed a narcotics habit or buy a Cadillac instead of paying the rent.

An explanation of why some of the poor behave as they do, and why handouts and social work are inadequate, has now been formulated neatly, concisely, even brilliantly, by anthropologist Oscar Lewis. After extensive field work in Mexico he has turned to the Puerto Rican slum dwellers of San Juan and New York. In his introduction to *La Vida* he presents a compelling thesis. Poverty may be ameliorated or even eliminated, he says, without necessarily modifying the vast and horrible "subculture of poverty"—a way of life that spits at middle-class values.

It is an outlaw subculture as Lewis describes it. Those who live in it are excluded from all the "major institutions of the larger society"—except the jail, the army and the welfare rolls. It is marked by a total lack of inner organization, for here no political parties are meaningful. When it gives rise to gangs, Lewis points out, it may alarm the rest of society but it nevertheless is a sign of comparative health. There is no real childhood in the subculture, for the biological readiness is all that distinguishes men and women from boys and girls. Above all, it is a way of living without a tomorrow. The present moment is all and satisfactions cannot be deferred, for doom sits on every threshold and the individual is helpless and hopeless.

Lewis does not describe this subculture as Puerto Rican or even as the culture of all of the poor. The subculture crosses national and racial lines and grows only in a particular soil. It has not been observed, he points out, among the hideously impoverished low castes of India, nor among the Jews of Eastern Europe, nor in primitive societies, nor, he suspects, in any Socialist country, whatever the state of its economic health.

The subculture mushrooms in the dark shadows of affluence, in a society whose highest expression is in terms of material wealth among people forever denied that wealth. It is a response to frustration.

Yet even when the root cause of the frustration is lifted, when income rises slightly and the housing pinch is relaxed, when cars and TV sets are within grasp, the subculture of poverty persists from generation to generation in a legacy of outlawry and despair.

If ameliorating poverty—unquestionably necessary in itself—does not always eliminate the subculture, what does? Lewis' answer is that the proposition's converse is true. The subculture can be destroyed without abolishing poverty. He cites Cuba as an example where, he says, people are still poor and still live in slums but the culture of poverty is gone. The poor have been incorporated into the mainstream of society; they have been given a sense of participation in history and the refreshing knowledge that there is a tomorrow.

Lewis' concept thus provides a realistic hope. Here is not the promise of salvation through social work or the deferment of hope until some ultimate reorganization of society. He suggests instead that the entire wretched pattern of poverty can be blown away by the winds of a ghetto revolution. Inevitably the reader must see in this concept a clarification of the battle cry of "black power." That potent phrase, read in the light of Lewis' thinking—though he does not refer to it—takes on a meaning that has nothing to do with complex attempts at definition or ultimate blueprints.

Lewis' thesis of the culture of poverty is established in a 50-page introduction which, for this reviewer at least, outweighs the 669 pages of documentation that follow. In getting his data, Lewis pursued the method of his Mexican research. He and his team move into an area armed with tape recorders and a profound sensitivity. A family is selected almost at random. A woman tells her story on tape. Her lovers, children, parents, friends, neighbors, tape their stories, casting oblique lights on the original telling so that incidents are seen from various vantage points à la *Rashomon*. An investigator drops in and chronicles every event in the course of a single day in the family's house.

The result is a mass of tape that must run to countless miles. This is edited down to publishable size, translated and produced as a document. It makes a harrowing book, certainly, but I do not know what it means. It is not needed to support the argument in the introduction and it does not strengthen it.

We are given a picture of abject brutalizing poverty—children giving birth to children in a senseless agony; sex in a thousand forms, minutely described, until the world seems a gigantic, monotonous brothel, underscoring the savage irony of the Spanish euphemism for whoring—La Vida. Lechery and drunkenness are detailed to the last spittle of vomit and the telling stain on the bed sheet. Here is loveless sex performed to a background of shrieks and curses. Here are children watching wild-eyed while their parents clutch each other in love and stab each other in hate.

Why does Lewis give us this? Is the Rios family meant to be "typical" and, if so, of what? Certainly, it is not a "typical" Puerto Rican family, and Lewis denies any suggestion that he intended it to be so. It may be typical of the particular slum in which Lewis worked but is not the whole concept of a "typical" family unscientific?

And if the Rios family is not typical of anything, then I do not know what this "slice of life" is meant to convey. Is it even a valid portrait of this one family? What criteria did Lewis use to sift out the details he excluded? Did he leave out the humdrum talk of clothes and weather and school and jobs? If so, then the day-in-day-out cacophony is misleading. Stripped of amenities even a family in Suburbia can reveal a gaping hell of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

obsessions and frustrations although, admittedly, these would find less horrendous manifestations.

But suppose that the material is indeed edited so that all that was excluded was only more of the same. Do we have here a faithful portrait of the Rios family? Is it possible to know a person by listening to a tape recording of his autobiography, supplemented by other taped autobiographies? I doubt it.

The art of knowing a person demands an ability to pierce the self-pretense which uses language to disguise rather than to reveal.

It is true that in these pages the compassionate reader may reassure himself that victims can be attractive people and achieve a kind of tragic dignity even though what they do appalls the senses. But he is left with a curiously incomplete picture, with raw material which cries for meaningful structure. Those with a taste for people and for life may wish that a novelist—without a tape recorder—would take up where Oscar Lewis left off. An artist who goes to that slum that stands between the sea and the walls of San Juan may one day give us the fuller truth that can be had only in fiction.

Last Chance for Democracy

OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War. *By John Bartlow Martin. Doubleday & Co. 821 pp. $7.95.*

WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS

Mr. Williams is currently on leave from the University of Wisconsin, where he teaches history. He is the author of The United States, Cuba and Castro (*Monthly Review Press*).

This is a detailed and movingly candid account, from the inside near the top, of American relations with the Dominican Republic from the fall of Trujillo in 1961 through the coup against Juan Bosch, and on to the suppression of the popular uprising of 1965 by American military intervention.

Every citizen seriously concerned about his country and its foreign policy should take or make the time to read this book. An effort is required, primarily because the reader has to confront and consider some of the principal issues on his own. Ambassador Martin is telling us many things about which he does not speak directly, or even intentionally; and one has the feeling that he began to make his own serious confrontations only in the course of his writing.

The Ambassador argues that good American intentions and basically sound American policy were overtaken by events, and quotes President Kennedy to make his point: "We did the best we could." In that context, Martin places major emphasis on the limits of American power. But it says a great deal for his perceptiveness and honesty, however, that the evidence he presents suggests precisely the opposite. Suggests, that is, that the effective use of America's vast power to implement a poor American policy defeated America's good intentions by forcing events to conform to a fundamentally mistaken and unsound conception of reality.

One clear indication of this pattern comes in the way that all the protagonists reveal an almost complete disregard of history. History is not magic; it does not supply answers to our problems. But it can make us aware of what has been going on before (and as) we make the scene, and thereby enables us to orient ourselves and provide a basis for using our intelligence to realize our ideals. It can, that is, unless our perception is clouded by a priori conceptions, and unless our intelligence is grinding along in the rut of making yesterday sufficient unto tomorrow.

Martin uses about one-tenth of his book to survey Dominican history. His theme is how a long, slow, painful movement toward effective self-government was seriously interrupted by American intervention between 1916 and 1924, and then by the Trujillo dictatorship. He describes the results, as of 1961, in these terms: "The Republic was a sick, destroyed nation, to be viewed as one ravaged by a thirty-years war, even one to be occupied and reconstituted."

It might reasonably be expected, on the basis of that kind of analysis, that American leaders would approach the Dominican situation with a willingness to take a long-range view, a recognition that many, many difficulties would arise before the country recovered its self-confidence and mounted a sustained effort to realize its potential, and a realization that vast aid would be required if the United States decided to become involved in the process.

What happened instead was a euphoric flip over what Martin repeatedly describes as the "matchless opportunity," or the "chance to do things that few people ever have." That kind of wildly romantic

FREEDOM AND ORDER IN THE UNIVERSITY

Edited with an introduction by Samuel Gorovitz

Essays by Paul Goodman, Walter P. Metzger, John R. Searle, Sanford H. Kadish, and Mortimer R. Kadish

The principal concern of this book is the conflict between the desire for individual freedom and the need for social order, with particular emphasis on problems arising out of this conflict within the university. The writers share broad agreement about the objectives and obligations of the university and the value of allowing students and staff alike full freedom for growth and development. Yet their positions cover a broad spectrum, and sharp disagreements emerge. **Goodman** holds that the only defensible order arises out of total freedom; **Metzger** provides an eloquent historical account of the development of academic freedom and appeals for its extension to students; **Searle** develops guidelines for dealing with problems of student freedom; and **S. Kadish** offers a defense of the judicious imposition of behavior-governing rules. Each of these essays receives comments from the other writers, and the final essay, by **M. Kadish**, presents a reflective discussion of the positions taken and the issues involved. **$2.95 paper, $5.75 cloth**

Available from your bookstore or

THE PRESS OF WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
Cleveland 44106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transcendence of the miserable truth is unquestionably necessary for the people who set about to make a revolution under such circumstances, but it is absurdly irrelevant on the part of outsiders—no matter how sympathetic.

One has constantly to hang on as the author first staggers us with accounts of how terrible it is, and then jolts us with his rhetoric about the golden opportunity. One quickly comes to feel that he is back with the prophets of the Great China Dream of the 1890s, or watching Woodrow Wilson boost himself into orbit with his rhetoric about making the world safe for democracy.

That is a good part of the trouble. It is all out of the past. Even Kennedy's touchstone, the New Frontier, was a relic of 19th-century thought. It seems clear, for example, that the last-chance-to-do-something-great excitement over the Dominican Republic was originally part of the Alliance For Progress reaction to Castro's success in wrenching Cuba out of the 19th-century American empire; and that the increased intensity of that attitude after the Bay of Pigs fiasco was part (along with Leap to the Moon) of a general fear in the Kennedy group that history was passing them by and that something had to be done—*quick!* Kennedy was at most only semi-facetious in his goodby to Martin: "If you blow this, you'd better not come home."

Martin constantly thought, talked and wrote about the "last chance for Dominican democracy." He could not avoid, therefore, being ultimately disappointed and defeated. For to define one stage of a long and tortuous process as "the last chance" is to trap oneself. But Martin was highly motivated, dedicated and capable —as well as running scared—and he did a great deal to hold the line for the American 19th-century view of the world prior to the inauguration of Juan Bosch early in 1963. He was very effective in helping the provisional government to survive, and in turning Dominican dissatisfaction, unrest and impatience into the formal channels of a national election.

But Bosch was a man who rocked the 19th-century boat. Ironically, he did so not because he was a 20th-century revolutionary but because he was a sensitive man of the 19th century who had a deep sense that neither he nor anyone else could make it work in 1965. He was thus fatalistic, indecisive and difficult. Martin was skeptical from the outset. "We could not trust Juan Bosch. For President he would not do." Yet in the end it was Bosch who gave Martin the insights that, largely unconsciously and not wholly formulated, are imbedded in this book. There was a significant difference, moreover, between Martin and his superiors in Washington. Martin was sufficiently open to reality to begin to move beyond his existing outlook, and he had the integrity to play it straight with Bosch. Given his approach, the only place to fault him concerns his long delay in initiating the routine courtly maneuvers (or ritual) that would have made it possible for Bosch to ask for extensive assistance on a crash basis.

It is doubtful that it would have made any difference. Martin's overlords in Washington were not capable of transcending their two basic convictions. First, that self-determination and democracy are *really* honored *only* when they produce results that conform to their conception of American experience and practice; and, second, that the Right produces more of those results than the Left. However, a commitment to self-determination transcends one's preferences and hopes about how it will be used. Self-preservation is the only legitimate basis for violating a commitment to self-determination. And, clearly enough, the Dominican Republic does not threaten the existence of the United States. But if the definition of self-determination as Americanization is accepted as being true, then the second axiom is also true. This false syllogism is the basis of American policy, and American leaders deploy American power in a sustained effort to force reality into that mold.

In the case of Juan Bosch, American leaders used American power very effectively by simply sitting on their hands. They hitched their britches, crossed their legs, sighed audibly, and let him fail.

"Plainly," Martin accurately reports, "the overwhelming majority of the Dominican people expected [Bosch] to make a revolution." Prompt and extensive American aid, given openly and sympathetically, was the only way Bosch could finance such a revolution, which would outflank the extreme Left and, at the same time, control the conservatives and the military.

It is extremely doubtful whether any underdeveloped society can reach 1966 by the strategy of marching through the morass of the 19th century even if it has massive American assistance, *but that is the only possible way that effort can have any chance of success.* We can provide the aid and make the effort through a close alliance with an informed, capable and honest native benevolent despotism. Or we can stand back and let the society make its quantum leap in its own way and through its own devices, and then reach an open and honest accommodation with the results.

That is the actual lesson of Ambassador Martin's book, and it needs to be mastered by the public so that it can drive it home to its leaders. For either America's leaders have not learned it or, if they have, they do not have the candor and guts to confront and resolve the issue with the American people. For Washington said "no" in response to Martin's requests to help Bosch. "Ever since Bosch has been in," a high embassy official reported to Martin, "we've been turned down." I

THE ULTIMATE ANTIENTROPY*

Unity is plural and at minimum two.
— R. Buckminster Fuller

Whether one paints five Helens
after some much experienced woman
or develops one, his beau ideal,
from the five, most lovely, untouched
virgins of Crotona (such Cicero's
account of Zeuxis' purist practice)
or laboriously patches her together
cheek by jowl out of all the women
he has shuffled through, are not
their ends the same?

So even he
who will not let the name of Helen
or woman, for that matter, be attached
to what he splotches on the canvas,
refusing to be tamed by recognition —
for he claims he paints a painting,
not a landscape, apples, females —
deems he's plucked from out his head-
long brain and brush a universal
as it is a most unique,

concrete
past any momentary model. And though
we may wish to celebrate the fleeting
or prefer the theory as it lords it
over its bleak and boring product,
Zeus, we recall, laid all (this every
time) his eggs in one small basket;
the consequence, in the most famous
case, was a Helen who inherited
her papa's quality

most jovial:
being so promiscuous, so radiant-
ly loose, that we have hardly seen
the last of her. The sparks her eyes
shot forth are seeds that will not die.
Men far flung still warm their hands,
their hearts, and more at the thought
of her as at the Troy the flint
of flesh against the tinder of a god
produced.

Helen, it seems, is more
herself the more she's reproduced.

THEODORE WEISS

*According to Norbert Wiener and R. Buckminster Fuller, "Man is the ultimate antientropy."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do not think Martin asked soon enough for nearly the amount of aid that was required. But the primary point is that the Kennedy administration made the initial decision to go all out in the Dominican Republic, and then backed off. Martin cannot be blamed for that failure, nor for Kennedy's failure to seize the opportunity to level with the American people about the fundamental issues and problems involved in foreign aid. Neither can Martin be blamed, whatever his own doubts about Bosch, for the Kennedy administration's disingenuous way of blaming the failure on Bosch. To be charged with failure, Bosch would have had to be given an opportunity to succeed. The Kennedy administration never gave him that chance.

What happened, of course, was that the military, supported by a segment of the business community, deposed Bosch. Martin mistakenly says the subsequent inability to control the military junta that replaced Bosch shows the limits of American power. But this is only a symptom. The real limits of American power are revealed in the inability to impose a 19th-century outlook on 20th-century reality. Behind that, of course, is the limit imposed by the inability to break free of that outlook itself. No one need worry about the limits of American power. There will be many such limits even after we enter the 20th century. But once we do, we can at least operate creatively within the new and relevant limits instead of behaving destructively in an effort to preserve the past.

True enough, U.S. air-borne troops and Marines suppressed the general and popular uprising of 1965. But the bubbles are again reaching the surface. There will be another revolution. And Martin has made an honest and courageous effort to keep us from making the same mistakes still another time around.

Bridge to Disenchantment

MY FOURTEEN MONTHS WITH CASTRO. *By Rufo López-Fresquet. World Publishing Co. 223 pp. $4.95.*

KAL WAGENHEIM

Mr. Wagenheim is editor of the monthly San Juan Review. *He has lived in Puerto Rico and covered Caribbean affairs for the past six years.*

Economist Rufo López-Fresquet—a lover of logic, efficiency and democratic procedures—ought to have been born in Scandinavia; instead, he was born in Cuba, whose history of administrative chaos, corruption and tyranny is the antithesis of his *manera de ser.*

Not that the author is a timid soul. As a student he opposed the Machado dictatorship and spent two years exiled in Mexico; in 1935 and 1953 he was imprisoned for anti-Batista activities, and after his release he was active in the clandestine movement in Havana which helped overthrow Batista and paved the way for Castro's dramatic entry to power. He then served as the treasury minister of Cuba's revolutionary government for fourteen months and nine days.

In 1960, "in bathing suit and sandals, and carrying only a .45 automatic, a few papers and some money," he disembarked from a boat at Key West, Fla., a refugee from Castro's Cuba. Now living in Puerto Rico (for the past few years he has been a tax consultant to the Puerto Rican Government), he is despised by some of his fellow Cuban exiles for his "radical far Left" ideas, and considered "too conservative and pro-American" by the Cuba he left behind. His book, written with the help of author-professor, Irving Peter Pflaum, and Mrs. Melanie Pflaum, is a detailed, if slightly disorganized, account of his intimate contact with the leadership of the Cuban Revolution, ranging from memorable anecdotes about Castro to the intricacies of Cuba's tax and agrarian reform laws.

López-Fresquet supported many of Castro's economic measures. "Cuba's ills," he writes, "were the symptoms of a structural malady that had to be torn up by the very roots." In 1959, while the "tourist zones and residential sections of Havana formed a dazzling picture," he reports that 90 per cent of all cars owned were registered in the capital city of Havana; that in the rural areas annual per capita income was only $90.25; only 11 per cent of the families drank milk and only 4 per cent ate meat; 43 per cent were illiterate and 36 per cent suffered from intestinal parasites; while throughout Cuba 37.8 per cent of the labor force was unemployed.

But, educated in the United States, married to an American wife, and friend and counselor to numerous U.S. businessmen in Cuba, López-Fresquet's dream was of a government that was "both democratic *and* friendly to the U.S." He saw his role as a "bridge to renew the traditional good relations that geography, history, culture and economy direct Cuba to maintain with the U.S." His disenchantment began with Castro whom he sees as "the fruit of Cuban soil, produced by immorality, cynicism and irresponsibility," with a "psychopathic suspicion of everything American" and no knowledge of "the activities of private enterprise." To López-Fresquet "no reconciliation was possible," and he resigned his cabinet post on March 17, 1960, spent several months trying to organize anti-Castro resistance, and finally went into exile.

Although López-Fresquet believes that "nothing that the U.S. could have done would have caused Castro to remain a friend," he "does not absolve the Eisenhower administration from its subsequent handling of the Cuban situation." He remembers the complacency of the two U.S. ambassadors to the Batista government, Arthur Gardner and Earl T. Smith: "whose deportment provided Castro with all the examples he needed to convince the Cuban people of the evil intentions of U.S. policy in Cuba," as well as "the decorations given to Batista's hired killers, and the assistance the U.S. military mission offered the army of the dictator." He recalls that the CIA, as early as May 14, 1959 ("a date when the only Cubans who opposed the revolutionary government were the *Batistianos*") had established a phantom corporation in Florida which later turned out to be the employer of the four U.S. pilots who died on the last day of the Bay of Pigs inva-

Gertrude Stein's masterpiece

THE MAKING OF AMERICANS

(the only complete version)

$10.95 plus postage from

SOMETHING ELSE PRESS, Inc.

160 Fifth Avenue, New York City 10010

Or ask your bookdealer for it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recent Books on Latin America

INTERNAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER: Counterinsurgency and Civil Action in Latin America. *By Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Renning. Ohio State University Press. 338 pp. $6.50.*

An explanation, with examples, of the U.S. military effort in instructing Latin American armed forces to crush revolutions—even before they begin.

TRUJILLO: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator. *By Robert D. Crassweller. The Macmillan Co. 468 pp. $8.95.*

Crassweller does an interesting job of exposing the scandalous life of the dictator, but his work does not probe the agony of the country's problems.

TRAVELS IN BRAZIL. *By Henry Koster. Edited and with an introduction by C. Harvey Gardiner. Southern Illinois University Press. 182 pp. $5.85.*

An account of a tour of Brazil during the early 19th century, told in a delightful and informative manner by an English traveler.

CHURCH AND STATE IN LATIN AMERICA. *By J. Lloyd Mecham. University of North Carolina Press. 465 pp. $8.50.*

An updated and revised edition of the most comprehensive study of church and state relations in Latin America. Excellent reference work.

MEXICAN MARXIST: VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO. *By Robert Paul Millon. University of North Carolina Press. 222 pp. $6.*

A biography of Mexico's leading labor organizer, which is sympathetic in tone but insufficiently analytical of the complex political scene.

NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA. *By Gerhard Masur. The Macmillan Co. 278 pp. $5.95.*

Surveys Latin America's nationalism from independence until the present, but not in depth.

NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA. *By Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan. The Free Press. 229 pp. $6.95.*

Dealing only with the 20th century, this study, though more informative than Masur's, also suffers from superficiality.

MARYSA NAVARRO GERASSI

sion. He also describes Castro's visit to Washington in April, 1959, and Eisenhower's sudden decision to fly to Georgia to play golf ("a diplomatic discourtesy"); Castro's meeting with Vice President Nixon ("this man has spent the whole time scolding me," Castro commented); the fact that the United States allowed light planes to fly from Florida in 1959 and burn Cuban cane fields and destroy sugar mills, and the "virulent campaign that certain sectors of the U.S. press waged against Cuba."

It was during that 1959 trip that López-Fresquet, upset by the U.S. press coverage, met with *Time* executive, C. D. Jackson, and asked him whether he thought his magazine's reporting was "objective."

"Whoever told you, young man, that *Time* is objective? We take sides and we combat whomever we place in a position contrary to ours," he records as the reply.

But he returns to Fidel Castro as the vivid center for the Cuban disaster:

> He [Castro] is fascinated by catastrophe. (If removed from power) he would flee, not to Switzerland, this is not his nature, but to some inaccessible region of Latin America where he will hope to become the center of a revolution for all of Latin America. . . . Possessed by a persecution complex, he approaches life as if he were still a guerrilla fighter in the mountains. He is not a coward . . . he is motivated by temerity. . . . [Castro] is not a real revolutionary, because he has no cause. He has used different causes and will fight against anything that tends to limit his actions. He speaks until he is tired. He eats until he is sated. He moves until he is exhausted. He will fight until he is killed. He rebelled against Batista, against the Cuban community, against the U.S. He will rebel against Russia. . . . He has not tried to organize the community to bring a better life to Cuba, he has tried to make the community an ally in his permanent rebellion.

Though Castro's version of a tropical "Great Society" has its grotesque aspects to López-Fresquet, he turns up little evidence that a Washington-oriented Cuba would be more attractive, and he ends as he began, in criticism of the United States. "At no time should the U.S. have felt limited to two alternatives: Batista or Castro. The U.S. has failed . . . it has not shown the Cuban people the hope of a future free from Communism and also free from personal dictatorship."

In a world where might makes right (Hungary, 1956; Santo Domingo, 1965), the López-Fresquets of this world may be right, but they rarely win.

An Anthology of Nothings

NIL: Episodes in the literary conquest of void during the nineteenth century. *By Robert Martin Adams. Oxford University Press. 249 pp. $6.*

H. R. WOLF

Mr. Wolf teaches at Eastern Michigan University. He has contributed articles to The Psychoanalytic Review *and* American Imago.

Robert Martin Adams' *Nil: Episodes in the literary conquest of void during the nineteenth century* takes us into the existential underside of 19th-century literature. What we had thought were the dominant qualities of the age—"social reform," "religious questioning" and "scientific growth"—are called into question by Adams: "The great game of stretching appearances to cover realities is one at which the nineteenth century was so surpassingly good that in effect the nightmare of Nothing comes mostly to those who, for a multiplicity of possible reasons, seek or invite it." A view of the 19th century as progressive and positivist is rejected by Adams and is replaced by a view which makes the century a possible scenario of an Antonioni film.

For reasons which are not clearly articulated in the first section of the book, Adams prefers to avoid a causative approach to our "void-haunted, void-fascinated age." Social and intellectual history are ruled out as a means of under-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

standing the development of existential consciousness. Somewhat petulantly, Adams writes off these critical perspectives as the "stock Darwin-Marx-Freud-World-War-I answer to this question." Ironically, some of the best pages in the book are devoted to an analysis of F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* in which Adams spells out with uncharacteristic clarity some of the philosophic sources of existential *Angst*. At a time when literary criticism is returning to a liberal imagination of the relationship between life and literature (Steven Marcus' *The Other Victorians* and Leo Marx's *The Machine in the Garden* come to mind), Professor Adams' study seems excessively formalist. It is New Criticism dressed up as phenomenology.

Because of the abandonment of social or intellectual analysis of ideas, and because of the nature of the material ("It [nothing] is never anything but a flat conception, a sudden blank; one is always a beginner in the study of this topic"), the book has what may be called lateral structure. Argumentation as drama (beginning-middle-end) gives way to a projection of a series of literary objects. In this sense, *Nil* is a catalogue, an anthology of Nothings, and will be useful for its parts, not its cumulative effect.

Since it is impossible to summarize what are presented as autonomous renderings of Nothing, I will present some of Adams' insights—usually provocative, always needing expansion and humility—into the rhetoric of void.

De Quincey is seen as setting up "purple passages" as a defense against direct confrontation with the void. This rhetorical "high-wire work" comes perilously close to falling but, in the end, maintains its balance, however precarious.

Poe's rationalism struggles to hold off dissolution of mind and matter: "Creature of threadbare exteriors, threatened by void without and vertigo within, Poe always raises the cracked house of reason next to the tarn of death and despair." Adams, for the most part, writes metaphorically, often drawing his imagery out of the texts he is working with. Criticism approaches poetry, and we find ourselves slipping *into* Nothing, rather than having it sized up for us.

In his discussion of Gogol's *Dead Souls*, Adams shows most clearly the relationship between narrative technique and void. The narrator of *Dead Souls*, in the act of narration, undermines the validity of storytelling. The first paragraph of *Dead Souls* is justly cited as an example of narrative subverting itself, turning away from the world it is turned toward: "The gentleman in the carriage was not handsome but neither was he particularly bad-looking; he was neither too fat nor too thin; he could not be said to be old, but he was not too young either."

For Flaubert, the acute sense of void derives "neither from introspection . . . nor from contemplation of ultimate distances . . . but from the middle ground of human experience and human history, seen in a special light." Society embodies Nothing. Style (one thinks of camp) is the only stay against void.

Baudelaire invokes Nothing as an escape from the impermanence of ego; *Moby Dick* is seen as an attempt to find a rhetoric that will suggest Nothing—the endless stylistic approaches to the whale; Mallarmé does not so much attempt to describe Nothing as to use language in such a way as to suggest its own dissolution: "Words themselves, jolted by radical metaphors and violent syntax out of their accustomed contexts, become multivalent and transparent, first as puns and anagrams, then through a series of connections so tenuous and intuitive as only to be symbolized by the relationships which make up a constellation"; for Wagner, it is Nothing as Liebestod; for Zola and Ibsen, it is sex and the fatal woman as Nothing; all these writers play variations upon Nothing. And others: Sénancour, Novalis, Maistre, James, Verhaeren, Leconte de Lisle, Stendhal, Barbey d'Aurevilley, Villiers de L'Isle-Adam, E.T.A. Hoffmann. And even so, the list is not complete.

Just as *Nil* is in need of a controlling social or intellectual perspective, so could it use a psychological vision. One would think that a discussion of self-destructive impulses and their relationship to 19th-century culture would be necessary. One would think also that the problem of identity—so often taking the form of feeling that one is *nothing*, nowhere—would have to be discussed in terms of the same cultural situation. To write such a book without alluding in some way to Erikson's work and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* seems hardly possible or, if possible, less than we would want from a critic-scholar of Professor Adams' obvious sensitivity and insight. In the absence of such controlling perspectives, one comes away from *Nil* without feeling that he now can turn to other 19th-century texts with a stable conceptual framework to help him.

At some points, the book moves toward these needs: in the discussion of Bradley; in the brief account of the exemption of major English novelists from the problem of *Nil*.

By Adams' own admission, this is a preliminary study; and there is no doubt that existential and phenomenological critics will draw out its tightly knit fabric. Well and good. But one must get behind mind or outside of it, especially when its content is a "blank." Alienation and schizophrenia have the caste of Nothing, but there are methods of analysis to bring Something into Being.

As the United States sets fire to Vietnam, a possible prelude to the last fire, the *rhetoric* of Nothing seems inconsequential against the sources and determinants of this urge toward annihilation. Literary criticism which is not in some sense political, which is not in some sense psychological, cannot serve the deepest needs of this time. The medium is not the message.

To Solve a Paradox

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. *By Thomas I. Emerson. Random House. 245 pp. $4.95.*

VICTOR RABINOWITZ

Mr. Rabinowitz is a member of the New York bar, and specializes in constitutional law, civil liberties and civil rights.

Every state, almost by definition, must resist sedition, most of all when it threatens to be successful; yet the democratic state, if it is to retain its character, must permit utterances which might promote successful sedition. The keeping of law and order is a basic responsibility of any state; yet speech which threatens law and order must be permitted in a democracy, even if the threat is real. To resolve these dilemmas, to solve these paradoxes, is an abiding problem in a free and open society. In the United States, the ground rules for the task are set by the First Amendment to the Constitution.

The need for freedom of expression is clear enough. It is the best method of advancing knowledge and discovering social truth; it provides the government with the public criticism without which despotism flourishes; it affords some degree of balance between stability and change; and finally (and perhaps most important), it is necessary if the primary function of a democratic society is to be met—the self-fulfillment of the individual and the complete realization of his dignity as a human being.

The courts as well as political commentators and philosophers have advanced a broad spectrum of approaches to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guarantees provided by the First Amendment. At one extreme, as in *Gitlow* v. *New York*, the Supreme Court applied the "bad tendency" test (since abandoned) and held that the state might punish utterances "tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime or disturb the public peace"; on the other, Justice Black and the late Alexander Meiklejohn have come close to advocating an "absolute test" which, while not "absolutely absolute," does limit the area of restraint to a minimum.

Aside from the problem of defining the abstract principles of freedom of expression, many other problems of interpretation are plain to a practicing lawyer. These arise on an administrative level but they are most important in practice. Actually, in applying the First Amendment, or any law, the standards should be clear and objective; otherwise every policeman and every magistrate will apply the rules in accordance with his own political concepts or his own psychological quirks which, realistically speaking, are not likely to be very progressive or to tend toward greater freedom. Since freedom of speech and press are meant to be exercised in large part on the streets, recognition by police officers of the limitation on their authority to interfere is important; it is small consolation for a street-corner speaker to know that if he is arrested, his rights will three years hence be vindicated in the Supreme Court.

Professor Emerson's essay (first published in the *Yale Law Journal* in 1963) is an effort to define general principles of First Amendment interpretation which will allow the greatest degree of freedom consistent with the existence of a structured state, and to formulate those principles in a fashion which can be understood and applied at all levels of government. Obviously, this is not an easy task and complete success can hardly be expected. Not only are the concepts difficult and the passions involved high but our thinking on this subject has been pragmatic rather than theoretical and, in our system, courts pass on issues on a case-by-case basis and elucidate general principles only in passing. Emerson's views are admittedly tentative but they make a long stride forward in the direction of a sound analysis of the problem.

His basic thesis is that under our Constitution the government may regulate only action, not expression, and it may regulate action only directly, not indirectly by regulation of speech, press or association.

If we understand Emerson correctly, advocacy of a change in our form of government, even by force and violence, should not be in itself subject to governmental regulation or restriction. It is time enough for the government to step in if necessary to prevent the force and violence. The same is true of the advocacy of any other doctrine, however objectionable it may be and however subversive of

WAR

The horse left its hoof print on the child's face
like a dulled scimitar cutting through a field
of swamp grass. Slit eyes, ruptured neck,
and terrible crushed teeth; nose ripped from bridge
to lips. She grins in razor beneficence at the white,
blasted, palace wall.

The scene: the tree on the hill
in place: the well, rim intact,
rope curling from the winch.
Wagon on the barn floor, traces
rolled around the center pole. The pitchfork
prongs warm and bright from work in the hayfields.

In the village beneath the guns
a child calls from the dust:
"Then something happened
A war has happened
It was called the Trojans war
Men had killed their enemy
Killing and death
biting and fighting
these did
for their braveness
they did
All but one side
has to win
But these men
shall try to win"

The cannons glide on the smoke
like dead fish on the oily surface
of a deck. A flower tumbles down
the empty street, stem over bud.
A white mare's head is pinned
by a spoke in the mud.

The soldier who guards the river-bend
falls into a dream of house and wife.
Boy child and woman sitting on a stone wall
bordering one edge of a courtyard.

As he dreamed the enemy left to guard the walls
of a ruined fort looked up from his trumpet
and saw the white plume of the dreaming guard
swagger in a down current of sun and wind.

He moves upon him with a short knife,
pulls it down through the plume and eye,
and plunges it into his throat.

In his dream the knife struck the brain
as the child prepared to jump from wall to
cobble pavement. Precisely it cut the retina in two
when his white sandal touched the cobble,
when his toe brushed the first rounded
sunlit curve of the pavement.

He swallows in the light and spits it out again.

The scene: the ruined altar. The
door of the ark bent on its silver
hinges. Flies on the holy breads.
A woman hit by the descent of the Rose Window
is impaled on the altar rail.

The wife lays the table
in the shade of the well,
in the center of the courtyard:
cool butter,
cream on berries
red melon
on the white plate.

NED O'GORMAN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

existing institutions. So too, group libel, the libel of religious, racial or ethnic communities, may not be regulated until it results in action harmful to the state—and then it is the action that should be restricted, not the libel. This position is often hard to take especially when our own ox is being gored, but take it we must if the principles of the First Amendment are to be upheld and consistently applied to provide the freedom of speech we all want to exercise on behalf of our own convictions.

There are times, of course, when words are used not to advocate or provoke action—they are in effect acts which in themselves have undesirable consequences. The Holmesian man who falsely shouts "Fire!" in a crowded theatre provides the classic example. Libel of an individual is another. Such utterances are, in Emerson's view, verbal acts and subject to governmental restriction. Mr. Justice Black would disagree, at least in the case of libel.

Emerson's analysis is detailed and often subtle; various uses of speech and press and their effect on both internal and external security are considered. Differences between public and private interests are explored and the relationship of free speech to each of them. In all, the essay is thorough and provocative.

There are many today who feel that the fabric of our society is threatened by race riots, sit-ins, black power, white backlash, civil disobedience, group libel and bitter, often unrestrained, opposition to the war —all being frequently reflected in expressions of extreme disrespect and even hatred for the Chief Magistrate of the nation and his associates. To such, any extension of First Amendment freedoms threatens law and order in its most fundamental aspects, and the temptation to impose restrictions on speech are almost irresistible.

Emerson's answer is twofold. First, our police force is quite capable of handling any illegal *action* which may occur, and from the point of view of the safety of the state there is no necessity for restricting expression. Further, and more significant, he urges that when a community seems unable to maintain law and order "the remedy lies in using other measures which will restore a basic consensus rather than in abandoning the system of freedom of expression." A state confronted with internal disorder always has the alternative of suppressing the disorder or addressing itself to the problems which give rise to the trouble. The choice in a democratic society ought to be clear.

There is a valuable appendix of selections from major Supreme Court decisions relating to the First Amendment.

Fluoroscoping the AMA

A SACRED TRUST. *By Richard Harris. New American Library. 218 pp. $5.*

RICHARD CARTER
Mr. Carter is the author of The Doctor Business (*Doubleday*) Breakthrough: The Saga of Jonas Salk (*Trident*) *and, currently,* Superswine (*Trident*).

This splendid book expands the series of *New Yorker* articles in which Richard Harris fluoroscoped the American Medical Association. Because the AMA impinges on the nerves of the body politic like some kind of socio-economic slipped disk, it has been examined repeatedly—seldom, however, with anything close to Harris' intelligence and wit.

I sometimes think that no American journalist of liberal persuasion considers his career official until he has written a book exposing the AMA, or unveiling the secrets of medical economics, or revealing the hideous truth about American health care, or all three. The books come in clusters at intervals which seem to be determined less by developments in medicine than by cyclical impulses in the publishing houses. Having written such a book myself, several clusters ago, I have become a harsh, sour, hypercritical judge of my successors in the chase. The way I figure it, they should work another side of the street and leave me in peace.

It can be assumed therefore that I understate when I call *A Sacred Trust* superb. It is the only good book in the current outbreak of doctor-AMA-health exposés. Harris is a first-rate researcher and a distinguished craftsman with a fluid, graceful, precise, epigrammatic style. Even more to the point, he is fearless. His politics are adult. He knows what makes the wheels move. He puts things in context. He is too sophisticated to expend his valuable indignation on the misdemeanors of the physician-as-a-person. He knows, and allows the reader to see, that the physician is a creature of the AMA and of the unreliable system of entrepreneur medicine championed by the AMA. (My only complaint is against the book's publisher for an inexcusable failure to supply an index.)

The "sacred trust" of the book's title is the Hippocratic responsibility of the physician to the rest of us. Harris does not belabor the point. He simply shows why the United States took until 1965 to establish a system of governmental health insurance (Medicare), and why it was the last industrial nation to do so. The AMA was why—with assistance from Congressional temporizers.

He tells the story from its beginnings: 1847, when the AMA began, and the years immediately prior to World War I, when the country came very close to adopting a health-insurance plan more serviceable than the anemic compromise which now appears in the statute books.

A Sacred Trust is mostly fresh and nonmedical. The story of how Medicare finally got through Congress chills the blood. It has never been told in this detail or at this level of understanding. Even if you think you know all you want to know about the AMA, you undoubtedly will find that certain aspects of the legislative process come as a shock. Indeed, having read Harris, I begin to wonder whether we exposers haven't been wasting our time on the AMA. Somebody really ought to take on Congress. Maybe Harris will.

THEATRE / Harold Clurman

Walking Happy is a new musical at the Lunt-Fontanne Theatre (book by Roger Hirson and Ketti Frings, lyrics by Sammy Cahn, music by James Van Heusen) based on Harold Brighouse's charming comedy *Hobson's Choice*. Despite its modesty, the original play was revived by the British National Theatre in 1964 because in its own winning way it celebrates a woman's role in giving her working-class husband the gumption to defy the old Victorian class system.

I Do! I Do! is another musical (book and lyrics by Tom Jones and music by Harvey Schmidt); it is based on Jan de Hartog's *The Fourposter*, a cute two-character comedy tracing the course of a marriage which lasts for fifty years.

I juxtapose information on these two shows not only because I saw them one after the other but because there is a little theatrical lesson to learn by contrasting them. *Hobson's Choice* is an endearing piece which deserves its longevity (it was first produced in 1916); *The Fourposter,* though pleasant enough, is a long string of clichés which in *I Do! I Do!* become pretty sticky, not to say "icky." Yet *I Do! I Do!* provides better entertainment than *Walking Happy*.

Walking Happy is an agreeable show—at moments it is almost as sweetly affect-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing as the original. (It might do very well in London, particularly if performed in a small house. A smaller house would help here too, but producing it that way would not be practical since hardly any show on Broadway can be staged for less than $75,000, while a musical is considered cheap if it costs no more than $250,000.) The cast is notable for the presence of the Englishman, Norman Wisdom, who has the appeal of a wispy busker (a London street singer), a slightly pathetic little man with great performing grit, and the American, Louise Troy, who really can act and sing.

There are some effective and well-choreographed numbers by Danny Daniels with lyrics to match, but the show's atmosphere is musty, due to the heaviness of Cy Feuer's direction and to Robert Randolph's settings. Randolph is an extremely able designer (*How To Succeed in Business Without Really Trying, Sweet Charity*) when he renders the hideous functionalism and razzle-dazzle of the modern urban scene, but his skill fails him when he has to convey the dejected intimacy of one of the north English black towns for musical comedy use. The production as a whole plods.

I Do! I Do! triumphs over its platitude through the chic, lightness, unobtrusive ingenuity of Oliver Smith's settings, the inventiveness of Gower Champion's fleet direction, and the immensely gratifying professionalism of Mary Martin and Robert Preston. These two do everything well from the projection of a song (I gagged at the lyrics of *What Is a Woman*? despite Miss Martin's dignified delivery), the sprightly execution of what are merely outlines of choreographic ideas: the barefoot prance over the bed in which the prop itself appears to dance. Miss Martin knows more about feminine stage make-up than any other American actress except Lynn Fontanne. She has never been better since *One Touch of Venus*, never more aptly instructed than by her present director.

I must mention that there is no chorus in the show and no one in the cast beside its two stars; the extra paraphernalia is never missed. One hopes that Miss Martin and Mr. Preston can retain their joy in performance throughout the long run *I Do! I Do!* will surely have.

I should like to say some enthusiastic things about David Westheimer's *My Sweet Charlie* (Longacre) because of its right thinking and humorously cordial sentiment in regard to personal relations between black and white. But I could only do so if the play were presented in Alabama or Mississippi. It is simplistic to the degree that I cannot make even a good "social" case for it in New York.

It is harmlessly sentimental and I did not mind seeing it (which is something I can't say about many more successful shows), but it contributes very little to anything it deals with. Its best features are the engaging performances of that good actor Louis Gossett and of 18-year-old Bonnie Bedelia, whom Gossett refers to joshingly as "ugly," though I found her singularly attractive. She is a pleasing actress and will get to be much better when she becomes sufficiently experienced not to follow her director as sedulously as she does now.

Arthur Barea in his book on Lorca has said apropos of that dramatist's *Yerma* (Vivian Beaumont Theater): "To a Spanish public it is a soul-shocking experience." One of the difficulties with Lorca on our stage is that he is a poet and a good part of his value is therefore lost in translation. This is not intended as a criticism of W. S. Merwin's translation in the production by the Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center; it is a comment on almost all the Lorca productions I have seen here and in France.

I am convinced that though the play is a "tragic poem," it is not at all without dramatic interest. I can imagine a production which might be thoroughly dramatic and moving. Even in some of the literal translations made by Ilsa Barea for her husband's book, I feel some of the beauty, power and originality which Spaniards claim for Lorca.

Yerma, besides being the name of the central character, is Spanish for "barren." The play's story deals with a woman furiously unhappy because she hasn't borne a child. But it is no more a play about the misfortune of that condition than all Renaissance paintings of the Madonna and the infant Christ are religious. It is a tragedy of modern Spain, which is one reason why Lorca is so profoundly appreciated in Spain not alone by the intelligentsia but by the unlettered public as well. Barea says that in this play Lorca "shows the moral conventions applied with such uncompromising completeness and self-revealing sterility that he provokes rebellion against them. . . ."

Though factually descriptive and psychologically particularized in regard to the woman, the play mirrors the attrition of Spanish life since 1898. The Church (Lorca is explicit about this) and the monarchy had much to do with it. Yerma is barren because her husband is and prefers to be sterile. He is intent only on cultivating his farm, on the sexual possession of the woman he has married, when he is not otherwise engaged, and on protecting his honor. Whatever Yerma's resulting obsession, it is clear that she teems with the passion forever present in the land and in its people, but is frustrated by the ruling masculine order and by her own submission to its code.

Read in even the barest translation, both the prose and verse of this play communicate extraordinary tension and strength, together with a vividly colorful lyricism. But the low-keyed production at the Vivian Beaumont is either tepid or dry in feeling—particularly apparent in so large an auditorium. The décor and movement are uninteresting or bleakly arty. The acting is bloodless even when it aims at being fiery, and the staging absurd.

How, for instance, can we believe that the peasants are coming from the fields when they emerge all too plainly from the recesses of the theatre basement amid subscriber-spectators from whom, except for costume, they are indistinguishable. This, it may be countered, is modern staging: no proscenium arch; scenes are to be played where the first five rows of the orchestra are normally situated, etc., etc. But the new convention in itself creates no more drama or theatricality than was provided by the painted backdrops, borders, returns, footlights of ancient vintage. On a truly naked platform, in a small studio with actors of stirring temperament instead of producers with limp theories, the play might come alive. Lorca would then achieve his proper stature as an intensely dramatic poet.

We regret that by an oversight our contributors booklist failed to include a book published in 1966 by our drama critic, Harold Clurman. It is The Naked Image: Observations on the Modern Theatre *(Macmillan, $6.50), a collection of theatre reviews and essays.*—Editor

The Best Way To Get THE NATION

THE NATION 1-2-67
333 Sixth Ave., New York 10014

☐ One Year, $10
☐ Two Years, $18
☐ 6 Months, $6
☐ Bill Me ☐ Payment Enclosed

(Foreign and Canadian Postage $1 a year extra)

NAME .....

ADDRESS .....

CITY .....

STATE ..... ZIP NO. .....

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED